Alan Sabrosky – The Unz Review Dec 8, 2024

“For they have sown the wind,
and they shall reap the whirlwind.”
-Hosea 8:7

The collapse of the Assad government in Syria is certain to be greeted with considerable satisfaction in Jerusalem and Washington. Both capitals of the Zionist Co-Dominium have long seen the Assads much as they did Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi. All were obstacles to Israel’s designs in the region.

All three were also targets of that nefarious policy of “regime change” highlighted by in the US after 9/11, as were four other countries in the region. Now the last of the three has fallen, albeit much later than the mostly Jewish neoconservative “chicken hawks” (so called because all advocated war but very few ever served in uniform) had anticipated back in 2001.

So What Caused the Collapse?

Internal dynamics within Syria that played their part, to be sure, but I will focus here on the external factors. A major reason was the unrelenting pressure and considerable resources poured into the assorted militias and jihadists trying to overthrow Syria’s regime. Money talks, and it talked very loudly here. So did the frequent Israeli air and artillery strikes into Syria. Shielded by the US, Russian forces in Syria could do little for their ally.

Then, too, the numerically small but politically significant, open-ended US military presence on the ground in Syria had their own impact, So did the limited but strategically significant direct military attacks by the US and other NATO countries on Syrian government forces and installations. Image matters, and here it mattered greatly.

Syria’s Assad could never match that. Only Russia (to a very limited extent) and Iran (to a even lesser one) really did much of anything. But Russia is caught up with the Ukrainian “tar baby” and Iran is hedging its bets in anticipation of America’s own “regime change.” A scarcity of strong, reasonably reliable allies also counts, and it counted here, but not in a good way.

Second, Syria lost the information and propaganda war, in a very big and very decisive way. The Jewish-dominated media in the US and most of Europe made sure that virtually every claim, no matter how ludicrous, of the jihadists and other anti-government elements in Syria was treated as Gospel truth. Few in the legacy media disputed their assertions, although many did in the alternative media and on social media platforms.

It wasn’t enough. Israel can rip Gaza apart and kill tens of thousands of civilians, but any criticism of its very real war crimes is almost universally denounced in the media and Western capitals as “vicious antisemitism” that needs to be suppressed and punished. That criticism was nothing of the sort, but it demonstrates the exceptional degree of Jewish influence throughout the West. It also underscores the accuracy of the axiom that “truth is the first casualty of war,” at least whenever Israel or its interests are involved.

Third, it is worth noting that this event saw insurgent militias and local jihadists do to the Syrian government forces what the US-backed mujaheddin did to the Afghan government and their Soviet allies, and later the Taliban (the lineal operational descendants of the original mujaheddin) did to another Afghan government and its American patron. It seems that local governments have very great difficulty holding out against insurgents who have an external sanctuary, external assistance, or both.

In all three cases cited above, the insurgents had both. In Syria, the government forces had also to contend with direct military attacks by Israel, the US and other NATO countries. What made it harder for them was that they essentially fought these external forces with one hand firmly tied behind their backs.

Other than in defense, Syrian government forces could only engage in occasional artillery duels with the Israelis, but not respond to air attacks in kind. Nor could the Russians assist them, other than defensively. Any attempt to respond directly to US, Israeli or other attacks meant a direct confrontation with the US, Israel covered by its American puppet, or NATO. The Syrians could not do this alone, and Syria simply was not worth enough to Russia to risk that kind of engagement.

Reflections

It will take some time for the implications of all this to become clearer (perhaps “less murky” would be more accurate). I expect the current Syrian government officials and senior military commanders are wondering if they will still be alive next week. I am not a specialist on Syrian affairs, but the historical track record in these situations would not reassuring to them.

I expect, however, a major consideration on the part of the winners will be the role intended for them by their foreign patrons .Do we want the new Syrian government to be another Egypt, at least insofar as Israel is concerned? Or is it something else?

Whatever it is, insurgent forces – even heavily infiltrated ones – have shown themselves to be exceptionally difficult to predict or to control, or even to influence, once they are in power.. Recall that the people the US armed to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan morphed into a Taliban which employed some of those weapons and techniques to force yet another humiliating American debacle.

The Israeli experience with these things is even more problematic. I was told back in the 1980s by a senior Israeli officer that they had successfully infiltrated every single Arab government and movement, relying principally on Sephardic Jews. So when Israel set up Hamas in the 1980s as a counter-weight to the PLO, I expect they thought they had made a good bargain. Yet it, too, changed over the years. Infiltrated or not, it has given Israel a more “interesting” time than it anticipated.

The case of ISIS and the Syrian jihadists is even more interesting. Now, “false flags” (attacking someone but making people believe someone else is doing it) is something of an Israeli specialty. The motto of Mossad, the best-known Israeli intelligence organization, is aptly “By Deception, Shall You Wage War.

Mossad it and its sister organizations have lived up to that motto since the founding of Israel. They have been aided worldwide by dual Israeli citizens, or Jews without Israeli citizenship, some Christian Zionists, and outright mercenaries.

Examples abound. Three of particular relevance to the US, for example, are the Lavon Affair in Egypt (1954), the attack on the USS Liberty (1967) and the 9/11 attacks (2001). Worth looking them up (do NOT trust either Wikipedia or Google search engine!), but here is a start on the last-named one.

The case of ISIS is even more intriguing. Supposedly a militant Islamic organization, it seems to have exceptionally great difficulty hitting Israeli or American targets anywhere in the world. This was a problem Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda, with fewer assets, obviously did not share

Despite the resources to field fleets of white Toyota pick-up trucks with heavy weapons in their beds and other paraphernalia, they found it an “almost” insurmountable challenge to strike what should be their own principal enemies. Curious, is it not? I wonder how many ISIS leaders have shared drinks with their Mossad and CIA contacts.

Last are the Syrian jihadists, easily the most fascinating facet of the Syrian puzzle. We are told constantly that these people are Islamic fanatics who spend their nights dreaming of how to kill non-believers, and their days trying to do it (or is that backwards?). But apparently there are “good” jihadists and “bad” jihadists. The former are those who do the bidding of Western governments (including Israel) and attack Muslim countries. The latter are those that apparently do not.

Peering Ahead

It is hazardous at best to anticipate what will emerge in the aftermath of the Syrian government’s defeat. At a minimum, I would expect the new rulers to order the Russians out. Of course, the Russians may not go, just as the US ignored the demands of many weaker governments to leave. Imperial powers, even if weakening and in a chaotic world, are often like that.

We may learn a bit more about ISIS and these “good” jihadists in Syria. Precisely what will they do in power? Will they be like the Taliban in Afghanistan? If not, what would that say about their actual character and hat of their leaders? Thought-provoking times, at best.

What is clearer is that what happened in Syria will embolden the Israelis to deal with the Palestinians within and Lebanon and Hezbollah without, especially once Trump is President and recognizes Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Trump is even more beholden to Israel than most US presidents, and Israel will capitalize on it.

Moreover, with Assad’s Syria removed from the game, Iran will move to the regional front burner. No person in the US can now even be a serious candidate for President without being in Israel’s pocket, much less be elected to that office, but the two American political factions have different priorities.

What this means is that the Neo-conservatives stacking up in Trump’s administration are an odds-on certainty to see this as a golden opportunity to complete their 2001 agenda and neutralize Iran. Knowing them, they and Jewish money will push (perhaps I should say “nudge”) Trump to do one of three things: (1) support Israel in attacking Iran, (2) join Israel in doing that, or (3) attacking Iran without Israel.

Greater Israel. Click to enlarge

The net effect is a far more dangerous 2025 than recent years have seen, and they have not been exactly a joy. We face civil upheaval at home and more war abroad, if Trump actually puts his agenda into effect. For Israel, Syria’s defeat and Trump’s presidency augur well on its march to a “Greater Israel.” For Palestinians. Lebanese and so many others in the reason, things have gone from bad to an almost unimaginably worse. For Americans, challenging times, indeed.

Alan Ned Sabrosky (PhD, University of Michigan) is a ten-year US Marine Corps veteran. He served in Vietnam with the 1^st Marine Division and is a graduate of the US Army War College. Dr. Sabrosky can be contacted at docbrosk@comcast.net

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