![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/02\/Russian-helicopters-over-Crimea.jpg\" "\\"Russian")
<\/a>Russian military helicopters flying into Crimea on Friday afternoon, Feb 28, 2014. Click to enlarge<\/p><\/div>\n
From the photographs we\u2019ve seen of the Russian special operations, or Spetsnaz, troops that intervened in Crimea, several things are obvious: They are secretive, moving without insignia and often covering their faces; they\u2019re disciplined and they\u2019re decisive.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n The diplomatic response to the Russian intervention is continuing. But Pentagon officials are beginning to assess the military \u201clessons learned.\u201d The bottom line is that Russia\u2019s move into Crimea was a study in the speedy deployment of special operations forces to achieve a limited objective<\/span><\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n \u201cWhat has been most striking to me so far has been the apparent levels of discipline, training and cooperation among the Russian forces,\u201d noted Paul Saunders, executive director of the Center for the National Interest, in an interview this week with the military blog War on the <\/strong><\/span>Rocks<\/strong><\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n The Russians deployed quickly in the hours surrounding reports of their initial movement on Feb. 26. Two days later, when President Obama warned that there would be \u201ccosts\u201d for invading Crimea, the Russian forces were already in place and the intervention was nearly a fait accompli.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n The Russians are thought to have had roughly 15,000 troops in Crimea when the crisis began, and quickly added about another 5,000, mostly special operations troops. The Russians are allowed up to 25,000 military personnel in Crimea under their 30-year lease of the Black Sea naval base at Sevastopol.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n Military analysts note some interesting characteristics of the Russian deployment: President Vladimir Putin, a former KGB lieutenant colonel, chose something closer to a paramilitary \u201ccovert action\u201d than a normal military attack. Because the troops didn\u2019t have Russian insignia, there was a thin veil of deniability, which the Russians exploited.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n At a news conference March 4, Putin denied that Russian troops had invaded, despite photographic evidence to the contrary. \u201cYou can go to a store and buy a <\/strong><\/span>uniform<\/strong><\/span><\/a>,\u201d insisted Putin. This \u201cdeniability\u201d was maintained by Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, who said March 5 it was \u201ccomplete <\/span><\/strong><\/span>nonsense<\/strong><\/span><\/a>\u201d that Russian troops had invaded Crimea and that he had \u201cno idea\u201d how Russian military vehicles had gotten there.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n These bland denials of reality were useful in several ways: They maintained a fig leaf of legitimacy for an illegal intervention; they allowed Russia a chance (not yet taken) to de-escalate an operation that hadn\u2019t officially been acknowledged; and they distanced Putin in case things went badly and Ukrainians were killed.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n Putin also showed a notable willingness to take risks. So far, there has been almost no bloodshed between Russians and <\/strong><\/span>Ukrainians<\/strong><\/span><\/a>, but Putin couldn\u2019t have known this when he began. That\u2019s why the precision and discipline of Russian forces were crucial. Their professionalism reduced the risk of an incident that could have spiraled out of control.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n Finally, Putin prepared a rationale for his intervention \u2014 along with the <\/strong><\/span>attendant <\/strong><\/span>propaganda<\/strong><\/span><\/a>. He insisted he was acting to protect Russian citizens and Russian speakers in Crimea. His troops were welcomed by a generally supportive Crimean population, and his action was lauded back home. This model suggests that Putin might be prepared to move, similarly, to protect Russians in neighboring countries, such as eastern Ukraine or <\/strong><\/span>the Transnistria region of <\/strong><\/span>Moldova<\/strong><\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n Analysts think Putin would be less likely to move against neighboring states, such as Lithuania and Latvia, that have significant Russian-speaking populations but that are NATO members. Such operations would require far more force \u2014 and would test NATO\u2019s \u201cArticle\u20095\u201d commitment to U.S.-led mutual defense, a risk that is probably greater than Putin is willing to tolerate.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n The well-organized Crimea operation also suggests improvement in the quality and training of the Russian military. Their troops had operated with far less precision a decade ago in Chech<\/strong><\/span>nya<\/strong><\/span><\/a> and in the 2008 invasion of <\/strong><\/span>Georgia<\/strong><\/span><\/a> . A botched attempt to free 850 hostages in a Moscow theater in 2002 resulted in the<\/strong><\/span> deaths of 130 of the captives<\/strong><\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n Russia evidently has been getting results for increased spending on its military: The <\/strong><\/span>2012 edition of an annual <\/strong><\/span>survey<\/strong><\/span><\/a> by the International Institute for<\/strong><\/span> Strategic Studies<\/strong><\/span><\/a> <\/strong><\/span>estimated that Russia would spend 3.78 percent of its GDP on defense in 2013, by far the highest amount in more than a decade. Aging or incompetent Russian officers have been purged as part of a modernization campaign.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n This Russian army, in short, is not the one that proved so feeble in Afghanistan. It is well-trained and stealthy and effectively uses a \u201csmall footprint.\u201d And Putin clearly wasn\u2019t deterred by NATO military moves that signaled a commitment to protect member states \u2014 but didn\u2019t convey a willingness to check Russian black operations in a friendly, neighboring region.<\/span><\/p>\n