{"id":332381,"date":"2026-10-25T07:50:19","date_gmt":"2026-10-25T07:50:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/?p=332381"},"modified":"2026-10-25T09:49:24","modified_gmt":"2026-10-25T09:49:24","slug":"the-road-to-civil-war-is-paved-with-restored-order","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/?p=332381","title":{"rendered":"The Road to Civil War is Paved with Restored Order"},"content":{"rendered":"

David Betz and Michael Rainsborough \u2013 The Daily Sceptic Oct 22, 2026<\/strong><\/h1>\n

Our recent essays<\/a> in the Daily Sceptic<\/em> on the prospect of civil war<\/a> in Western societies<\/a> have examined the fragmentation of communities, the erosion of common national allegiances and the declining authority of institutions through which competing interests have traditionally been reconciled. Drawing upon our work on strategy, insurgency and organised armed violence, we have argued that these developments are creating circumstances in which civil war has become a real possibility. The latest upheavals in France<\/a> reveal another aspect of that trajectory. Even when the streets eventually fall quiet, the experience of violence may alter the balance between the state and its opponents, leaving a more combustible environment for the next crisis.<\/p>\n

France\u2019s history is punctuated by eruptions of popular unrest, from May 1968 and the mass strikes against Alain Jupp\u00e9\u2019s reforms in 1995<\/a> to the banlieue<\/em> riots of 2005, the gilets jaunes<\/em> movement and the urban violence of 2023. The events of October 2026<\/a> have again exposed antagonisms that successive governments have struggled to contain. Although these conflicts have arisen from different grievances, a familiar pattern is discernible. The streets erupt, the authorities seek to regain control, and eventually the immediate crisis subsides.<\/p>\n

The restoration of relative calm, however, does not necessarily return a society to its previous condition. Hostilities persist, militant organisations acquire experience, and populations gradually accommodate levels of violence once considered intolerable. The temperature rises by increments, even as each crisis appears to have passed.<\/p>\n

Writing in the Times<\/em>, Melanie Phillips<\/a> has raised the question of whether civil war has already begun. P. K. O\u2019Sullivan\u2019s<\/a> thoughtful contribution to the Daily Sceptic<\/em> approaches the question by examining the deterioration of ordinary social relationships as disagreements harden into personal hostility and rival constituencies cease to recognise one another as members of a common political community. There are, however, advantages to standing back from the tear gas. Such divisions acquire strategic significance when violence becomes organised, opposing movements adapt to successive clashes and the bonds between citizens and the state begin to weaken.<\/p>\n

The distinction between civil peace and civil war is consequently less straightforward than any eventual reassertion of public control might suggest. A society like France can suppress outbreaks of violence while absorbing their cumulative effects, until practices once regarded as exceptional become accepted features of everyday existence. An outward return to normality may conceal the erosion of the foundations upon which civil peace depends.<\/p>\n

France\u2019s politics of the street<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Revolutionary and trade-union movements in France have long challenged<\/a> governments through strikes, demonstrations and street mobilisation, while the gilets jaunes<\/em><\/a> demonstrated how decentralised protest could sustain pressure outside established organisations. A different source of hostility towards the Republic has emerged among sections of its North African Muslim population, rooted in the legacy of colonial rule, alienation from French society and, in some quarters, Islamist militancy. Andrew Hussey\u2019s The French Intifada<\/em><\/a> (2014) offered a perceptive English-language account of these tensions and their historical origins. Although differing in their grievances, objectives and constituencies, these various movements expose the French state to pressures arising from competing allegiances and conflicting conceptions of political authority.<\/p>\n

The changing character of urban violence is documented in the French Senate\u2019s inquiry into the riots of 2023<\/a>. Unrest spread across 672 communes in 95 departments, compared with approximately 300 communes in 25 departments in 2005<\/a>. The inquiry recorded substantially greater destruction of public property, including attacks on police stations, municipal buildings and schools. Rioters also employed pyrotechnic projectiles against security forces, mounted coordinated assaults and used social media to organise their activities<\/a>. The findings reveal an escalation in the geographical extent, intensity and methods of urban violence, despite the return of public order following the earlier riots.<\/p>\n

The upheavals of October 2026 brought together economic discontent, radical-Left militancy and opportunistic violence. Demonstrations over living costs and public services were accompanied by looting, attacks on public buildings and clashes with security forces<\/a>. Government accusations against radical-Left militants, alongside reports of black-bloc participation<\/a>, raised questions about the involvement of organised activists. As the violence subsides, its significance extends beyond the damage and mayhem. Whatever the immediate outcome of the disturbances, their significance extends beyond the damage and mayhem. The economic and political antagonisms exposed by the violence will not disappear simply because the authorities eventually restore order.<\/p>\n

The normalisation of escalation<\/strong><\/h2>\n

As violence subsides and the authorities regain control of the streets, the immediate crisis gives way to the familiar routines of public life. Yet the restoration of relative peace reveals little about whether the underlying conflict has diminished.<\/p>\n

Each episode of violence leaves its participants better acquainted with the methods and capabilities of their adversaries. Militant organisations improve their coordination, establish contacts and evaluate the effectiveness of their actions<\/a>. Security forces adapt their preparations, deployment patterns and methods of enforcement<\/a>. Political parties assess the advantages gained or lost, while residents and businesses reassess their safety and confidence in public institutions.<\/p>\n

The longer-term significance of these encounters depends upon the ability of organisations to preserve and apply what they have learned. An unorganised crowd may disperse without leaving behind any group capable of mounting further attacks. Established militant networks, by contrast, can retain personnel, refine their methods and pursue their objectives across successive confrontations. Their resilience may prove more consequential than the immediate scale of destruction.<\/p>\n

Governments and populations also adjust to repeated outbreaks of violence. Police deployments become routine, while emergency expenditure, enforcement measures and concessions enter the familiar repertoire of official responses<\/a>. Businesses make allowances for further unrest, and political parties factor the prospect of renewed confrontation into their calculations.<\/p>\n

A state can become more proficient at suppressing riots even as the hostilities sustaining them grow more entrenched. Its coercive superiority may remain unquestioned while its political legitimacy deteriorates<\/a>. Success in containing individual crises can therefore conceal a more fundamental weakening of public authority.<\/p>\n

Established routines of crisis management can compound this problem by reducing the pressure on governments to address the sources of unrest. Once the streets have been cleared and ordinary administration resumes, the apparent success of the official response may encourage complacency about the prospect of renewed violence. Governments can suppress the immediate expression of social antagonisms without diminishing the hostility that sustains them. Reliance upon policing and emergency measures may leave the underlying grievances unresolved, while encouraging governments to mistake the restoration of order for a lasting political settlement. Containment becomes an end in itself, even as the prospects for lasting civil peace recede.<\/p>\n

Revolutionary politics and the uses of violence<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Revolutionary violence is rarely confined in its purposes to the immediate confrontation with the authorities. Attacks upon established institutions can expose their vulnerabilities, provoke responses that deepen public hostility, attract recruits and encourage wider mobilisation. The strategic calculation concerns not simply the damage inflicted, but the reactions that violence provokes and the advantages that may follow.<\/p>\n

The French radical Left encompasses Parliamentary organisations, revolutionary groups, anarchist networks and militants employing decentralised black-bloc tactics<\/a>. Their objectives and attitudes towards violence differ substantially. La France Insoumise<\/em> (LFI), founded by Jean-Luc M\u00e9lenchon, pursues its ambitions through electoral politics, while some extra-Parliamentary formations regard physical confrontation with the state as an instrument of revolutionary struggle. The absence of common direction, however, does not preclude overlapping interests. Parliamentary movements can benefit from the pressure generated by mass mobilisation, while militants exploit demonstrations to pursue objectives that the wider movement neither shares nor controls.<\/p>\n

M\u00e9lenchon\u2019s response<\/a> to the October riots illustrates the strategic ambiguities of this relationship. He defended the protests, condemned police conduct and blamed the Government for the unrest. Although he instructed supporters to avoid looting and destruction, his public statements were markedly more critical of the police than of those responsible for the violence. Asked about officers injured by rioters, he described their injuries as an occupational risk; questioned about anti-police slogans, he responded equivocally. His position has intensified controversy over the relationship between LFI\u2019s Parliamentary ambitions and militant activism.<\/p>\n

Prime Minister S\u00e9bastien Lecornu<\/a> has drawn attention to these associations, citing LFI deputy Rapha\u00ebl Arnault\u2019s role in founding the subsequently dissolved<\/a> antifascist organisation Jeune Garde<\/em>. Although this connection does not establish LFI\u2019s involvement in directing the riots, it illustrates the links that can exist between Parliamentary radicalism and militant networks. Such organisations may appeal to similar constituencies and share certain objectives while pursuing different methods.<\/p>\n

The political consequences of militant activity also depend upon the reactions of its opponents. Marine Le Pen\u2019s National Rally<\/a> has presented the violence as evidence of Governmental incapacity and the necessity of restoring public authority. Militancy directed against the established order can therefore strengthen the appeal of nationalist adversaries, just as police intervention can reinforce revolutionary accusations of repression. In each case, the actions of one side may advance the interests of another.<\/p>\n

The strategic significance of riots and street violence extends beyond the intentions of their instigators. Revolutionary militants, Parliamentary movements, nationalist organisations and state authorities pursue competing objectives, but their actions can provoke responses that benefit their adversaries. Political violence may consequently intensify antagonisms and produce outcomes that none of the participants intended or can fully control.<\/p>\n

From unrest to civil war<\/strong><\/h2>\n

The progression from street violence towards civil war depends upon the emergence of organisations capable of sustaining armed conflict beyond individual outbreaks. Civil war<\/a> involves a struggle over political authority in which opposing forces possess the leadership, resources and cohesion to pursue their objectives through sustained violence. Widespread hostility and prolonged rioting may encourage the formation of such organisations, but do not, in themselves, amount to civil war.<\/p>\n

Militant networks and communal defence groups can develop through successive confrontations, retaining experienced members, establishing contacts and securing material support. Their survival depends in part upon constituencies willing to provide recruits, resources and protection. The crucial development is their ability to maintain an organised presence and prepare for further violence after the immediate clashes have ended.<\/p>\n

The emergence of rival groups can accelerate the movement towards armed conflict. Preparations for violence by one constituency may persuade its opponents that similar measures are necessary for their own security. Each regards its precautions as defensive while interpreting those of its adversaries as evidence of hostile intent. Such security dilemmas<\/a> encourage reciprocal mobilisation, even where neither side initially seeks a wider armed struggle.<\/p>\n

As rival organisations gain strength, the state\u2019s monopoly of legitimate force<\/a> comes under increasing pressure. The willingness of citizens to accept adverse electoral outcomes rests partly upon confidence that public institutions will protect them and uphold commonly recognised rules. When that confidence falters, organisations promising communal protection or retaliation acquire greater standing among their supporters. Groups initially established for defence can gradually assume powers of intimidation, enforcement and local control, challenging the state\u2019s position as the recognised guarantor of public security.<\/p>\n

Historical experience illustrates how differently such developments can unfold. Italy\u2019s Years of Lead<\/a>, from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, witnessed revolutionary and counter-revolutionary terrorism without bringing down the constitutional order. Northern Ireland<\/a>, by contrast, experienced three decades of armed conflict rooted in competing communal allegiances and constitutional claims. The differences reflected the ability of armed organisations to maintain their campaigns, the support they commanded within their communities and the capacity of public institutions to withstand the challenge.<\/p>\n

The riots in France have demonstrated, yet again, that militant groups can organise and sustain violent confrontations<\/a> with the authorities. The question is whether these groups can maintain their organisation between outbreaks, attract support from wider constituencies and eventually challenge the state\u2019s authority through sustained armed violence. Such developments can proceed while elections continue, constitutional institutions function and governments retain the means to suppress individual outbreaks. Even so, the survival of the state\u2019s formal institutions offers no assurance that its authority remains secure among the populations it governs.<\/p>\n

The tensions exposed by France\u2019s recent upheavals are not confined to the Republic. Economic stagnation, immigration, disputes over national identity and declining confidence in established institutions<\/a> have generated antagonisms across Western Europe, although their expression differs between countries. Similar outbreaks of violence may arise from common social and political pressures, the spread of militant tactics or cooperation between organisations. The appearance of unrest in several countries does not, however, establish that the participants share common objectives or operate under coordinated direction.<\/p>\n

The coexistence of different forms of militancy presents a further complication. Islamist activism, revolutionary-Left violence, communal hostility and anti-establishment protest arise from different ideological traditions and pursue different objectives. Their activities may nevertheless challenge the same institutions, while official responses to one movement can influence the conduct of others. Governments may consequently face mounting pressures from organisations that neither cooperate nor share a common political programme.<\/p>\n

Britain exhibits its own combination of these tensions. Demographic fragmentation, declining confidence in public institutions<\/a> and competing conceptions of national identity<\/a> have weakened the sense of common citizenship upon which constitutional politics depends. As disagreements over immigration<\/a>, cultural identity and the impartiality of public institutions become more pronounced, the willingness of opposing constituencies to recognise one another as legitimate participants in a shared political community comes under strain.<\/p>\n

What follows the restoration of order?<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Arguments about whether civil war has already begun usually turn on what constitutes civil war: sustained organised violence, rival armed groups or the loss of state control over particular populations and territories. These are useful distinctions, but by the time such developments become unmistakable, the forces driving a society towards civil war may have been at work for years.<\/p>\n

The normalisation of escalation helps explain why. Riots subside, but militant organisations retain what they have learned, opposing communities become accustomed to the threat of violence, and confidence in public institutions weakens. France offers a telling example. The riots of 2023 were more widespread and destructive<\/a> than those of 2005, despite the intervening years of relative calm. The violence of October 2026 adds another chapter to this history, although the consequences will depend upon what the participants have learned and how they respond to future confrontations.<\/p>\n

The question of when civil war begins is inseparable from the processes through which civil peace ceases to function. A society may repeatedly restore order to its streets long after the conditions necessary for maintaining civil peace have begun to disappear.<\/p>\n

David Betz is Professor of War in the Modern World, King\u2019s College London; Michael Rainsborough is Professor of Strategic Theory and Director of the Centre for Future Defence and National Security, Canberra.<\/em><\/p>\n

Donate<\/strong><\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

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Source\u00a0<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

After nearly two decades of relative calm, the riots of 2023 were considerably more widespread and destructive than those of 2005. Moreover, France is not alone in its urban social fragmentation. Will we see similar scenes in cities across Europe in the years ahead?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":39262,"featured_media":332382,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_et_pb_use_builder":"","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[77],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-332381","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-feature-posts"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/332381","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/39262"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=332381"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/332381\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":332411,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/332381\/revisions\/332411"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/332382"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=332381"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=332381"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=332381"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}