{"id":331055,"date":"2026-09-14T06:12:11","date_gmt":"2026-09-14T06:12:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/?p=331055"},"modified":"2026-09-16T07:59:48","modified_gmt":"2026-09-16T07:59:48","slug":"what-irans-resilience-tells-china-russia-about-us-power","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/?p=331055","title":{"rendered":"What Iran\u2019s resilience tells China, Russia about US power"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1 style=\"text-align: center;\"><strong>Seyed Reza Hashemi Jebeli \u2013 Asia Times Sept 9, 2026<\/strong><\/h1>\n<p>When the US-Israeli war against Iran began, few in Beijing or Moscow likely expected Tehran to withstand military pressure from two of the world\u2019s most capable powers.<\/p>\n<p>In the early days, US and Israeli air, intelligence and technological superiority were striking, and Iran suffered heavy blows. But what could have been a short campaign to disable Iran\u2019s military capabilities has turned into a longer, costlier war.<\/p>\n<p>Despite severe losses, Iran has preserved its political structure and much of its military response capability \u2014 proof that inflicting extensive damage and forcing surrender are two very different things.<\/p>\n<p>This resilience is more than a battlefield development. For China and Russia, the war has become a real test of the limits of American power. The two countries have different stakes in the conflict, but neither can treat a decisive Iranian defeat as a purely Middle Eastern matter.<\/p>\n<p>Both appear to understand that if the United States can use military superiority to strategically weaken one of West Asia\u2019s most important independent powers, the region\u2019s balance of power will shift, with consequences reaching into the broader geopolitical and geoeconomic contest among Washington, Beijing and Moscow.<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: center;\"><strong>China\u2019s dilemma<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>China may have more economic reason than any other major power to want the war to end. Disruptions to energy flows and insecurity in the Strait of Hormuz hit the Chinese economy directly, since China has been Iran\u2019s largest oil buyer for years.<\/p>\n<p>Reuters reported that China\u2019s seaborne crude imports in August 2026 stood at roughly 7.14 million barrels per day, nearly 40% below the prewar average. The disruption has also cut Chinese refineries off from a key source of crude.<\/p>\n<p>But this is where Beijing\u2019s central contradiction begins. The war\u2019s continuation hurts China, yet it cannot easily welcome Iran\u2019s strategic defeat either. Iran is not merely an oil exporter to Beijing; Tehran is part of the network of relationships China has built across West Asia to expand its economic and political influence without the military alliances the US relies on.<\/p>\n<p>A severe weakening of Iran would mean more than a shift between Tehran and Washington \u2014 it would mean greater US influence in the region and less strategic space for China. China\u2019s conduct bears this out. Its support for Iran has never been confined to political statements during years of maximum US pressure.<\/p>\n<p>For one, Beijing has remained a major buyer of Iranian oil, and independent Chinese refineries have remained among the most important markets for that oil even under threat of secondary US sanctions, which is why Washington has made Chinese purchases a centerpiece of its economic pressure campaign.<\/p>\n<p>That relationship has only grown more consequential during the war. As Washington works to cut off Iran\u2019s oil exports and related financial channels, China remains one of the few major economies able to absorb part of the pressure on Tehran.<\/p>\n<p>For Beijing, buying Iranian oil is not simply a commercial transaction \u2014 it\u2019s part of a larger contest over how far US sanctions can dictate the behavior of major economies outside Washington\u2019s orbit. That is also why US pressure on Chinese buyers has become a persistent point of friction between the two powers.<\/p>\n<p>China\u2019s support isn\u2019t limited to economics, either. US reports in recent years have pointed to Iranian access to certain dual-use technologies, including some used in its drone and missile programs, through companies and commercial networks linked to China.<\/p>\n<p>A distinction should be drawn between official Chinese government policy and the activities of China-based commercial networks. Still, those networks illustrate how the economic relationship helps preserve part of Iran\u2019s technological and industrial base under sanctions.<\/p>\n<p>Diplomatically, Beijing has likewise declined to support Iran\u2019s complete isolation. China, alongside Russia, has repeatedly called for a political resolution and opposed international measures it considers unilateral pressure on Iran.<\/p>\n<p>That doesn\u2019t mean Beijing is committed to defending Iran militarily \u2014 it continues to seek an end to the war and stability along energy routes. But there\u2019s a meaningful difference between ending the war and ending it with Iran severely weakened and the regional balance tilted toward Washington.<\/p>\n<p>This is where Iran\u2019s resilience matters most for China. The more Tehran shows it can maintain its response capability after heavy attacks, the more complicated Beijing\u2019s calculus becomes about the consequences of a decisive Iranian defeat.<\/p>\n<p>China doesn\u2019t need to enter the war to support Iran. Its economic, commercial, technological and diplomatic tools let it resist Tehran\u2019s total isolation without becoming a direct party to the conflict.<\/p>\n<p>Perhaps the most valuable thing China is gaining from this war, though, is neither oil nor its relationship with Tehran, but a strategic lesson about the United States itself. The conflict has let Beijing observe US forces\u2019 actual performance in a high-intensity war, including with regard to long-range strikes, air operations, ammunition consumption, logistics, missile defense and more.<\/p>\n<p>For a country whose future competition with Washington centers heavily on Taiwan, that experience is far from trivial.<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: center;\"><strong>Russia\u2019s stake is different<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>Russia\u2019s calculation diverges from China\u2019s. Moscow doesn\u2019t share Beijing\u2019s dependence on Middle Eastern energy, and higher energy prices can even create short-term advantages for the Russian economy. For the Kremlin, the Iran question is bound up instead with Russia\u2019s position in Eurasia and the prospects for a multipolar order.<\/p>\n<p>Iran is not just a regional partner for Moscow \u2014 it\u2019s one of the few powers simultaneously locked in conflict with the US and Israel, capable of pulling some geopolitical pressure on Russia away from Europe and Ukraine and toward the Middle East.<\/p>\n<p>A recent analysis in Middle East Policy argues the war has created short-term strategic advantages for Russia while raising Iran\u2019s importance to both Russia\u2019s regional standing and its relationship with China.<\/p>\n<p>Evidence of Russia-Iran military cooperation extends well beyond politics. Financial Times reporting indicates that Russian experts have worked with Iran since 2023, under a secret program, to develop propulsion technology for hypersonic cruise missiles \u2014 cooperation that continued into 2026. Other reports point to satellite cooperation and transfers of military equipment between the two countries.<\/p>\n<p>None of this amounts to a formal military alliance. Neither China nor Russia has extended Iran a security guarantee comparable to the mutual commitments of a formal defense pact.<\/p>\n<p>But that informal cooperation may be the most important feature of these relationships today: both powers can use economic, technological and diplomatic tools to strengthen Iran\u2019s capabilities and constrain US pressure without committing to a direct war with Washington.<\/p>\n<h2 style=\"text-align: center;\"><strong>Emerging new global order<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>Ultimately, the significance of the US-Israeli war against Iran doesn\u2019t hinge only on who gains the upper hand on the battlefield. The larger question is whether the United States can still use its military and economic superiority to impose its preferred political outcome on a regional power.<\/p>\n<p>For China and Russia, the answer matters in more ways than one. If Iran can keep resisting despite military pressure and economic sanctions, the war will show that America\u2019s ability to inflict damage is not the same as its ability to impose a political order \u2014 a lesson especially relevant to China as it prepares for long-term competition with Washington.<\/p>\n<p>At the same time, China and Russia\u2019s conduct shows that challenging US hegemony doesn\u2019t require a formal anti-American alliance. Buying Iranian oil, sustaining trade, transferring technology, cooperating militarily and wielding UN Security Council vetos are all part of a broader toolkit that raises the cost of unilateral US power.<\/p>\n<p>On April 7, China and Russia vetoed a Security Council resolution on the Strait of Hormuz, with Beijing explicitly arguing the council shouldn\u2019t legitimize unauthorized military operations.<\/p>\n<p>None of this suggests a cohesive China-Russia-Iran axis is emerging. Their interests diverge in many respects, and none is willing to bear unlimited costs on another\u2019s behalf.<\/p>\n<p>But the war in Iran could accelerate a broader shift from an order in which the United States sets the rules and outcomes of international crises toward one in which rival powers can raise the price of that exercise of power. The war has made the contours of this emerging order clearer.<\/p>\n<p>For Beijing and Moscow, Iran\u2019s fate is not simply the fate of a regional partner. It is a test of whether the United States can still determine a war\u2019s outcome on its own or whether other powers, through resistance, partnerships and counterpressure, can raise the costs of US hegemony high enough to push the international order inexorably toward multipolarity.<\/p>\n<p><em>Seyed Reza Hashemi Jebeli is a PhD candidate in international relations at Imam Sadiq University in Tehran, specializing in Iranian foreign policy, China-Iran relations, China\u2013Middle East affairs and the emerging global order<\/em><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/asiatimes.com\/2026\/09\/what-irans-resilience-tells-china-russia-about-us-power\/\">Source<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Iran&#8217;s survival under heavy assault offers Beijing and Moscow a live case study in how US forces actually perform in war<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":39262,"featured_media":328776,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_et_pb_use_builder":"","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[51,146],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-331055","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-Iran","category-iran-u-s-israel-war"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/331055","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/39262"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=331055"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/331055\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":331056,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/331055\/revisions\/331056"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/328776"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=331055"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=331055"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=331055"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}