{"id":312715,"date":"2025-07-27T07:12:08","date_gmt":"2025-07-27T07:12:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/?p=312715"},"modified":"2025-07-28T14:30:25","modified_gmt":"2025-07-28T14:30:25","slug":"unacknowledged-false-flags-the-october-7th-hamas-attack-part-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/?p=312715","title":{"rendered":"Unacknowledged False Flags: The October 7th Hamas Attack \u2013 Part 2"},"content":{"rendered":"

Iain Davis \u2013 Off-Guardian July 25, 2025<\/strong><\/h1>\n

In\u00a0Part 1<\/a>\u00a0we looked at the official account of the October 7th Hamas Attack. In addition to a rocket barrage on multiple targets and maritime assaults, an estimated 2,900 Hamas-aligned \u201cterrorists\u201d breached the Israeli \u201cIron Wall\u201d defences surrounding Gaza in 29 separate locations simultaneously.<\/p>\n

The \u201cterrorists\u201d took out all the vital communication infrastructure and key Israeli strategic positions, thus leaving Israeli defences unable to respond for many hours. The attack surprised the Israeli intelligence community which was taken off guard by the scale and speed of the Hamas Attack.<\/p>\n

Before we start to examine the evidence revealing the absurdity of the official account we should pause to think about what the word \u201cterrorist\u201d means.<\/p>\n

There is no clear definition of \u201cterrorism\u201d in\u00a0international law<\/a>. The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counter-terrorism, Professor Ben Saul, points out that the \u201cordinary meaning of terrorism is simple: extreme fear.\u201d<\/p>\n

So why is the Hamas Attack considered an act of terrorism while the Israeli\u00a0firebombing of Palestinian children<\/a>\u00a0in their schools, refugee camps and hospital beds is called an act of war?<\/p>\n

Saul notes that intergovernmental\u00a0consensus<\/em>\u00a0determines terrorism to be:<\/p>\n

\u201ccriminal violence intended to intimidate a population or coerce a government or international organisation; some national laws add a further specific intention to advance a political, religious, or ideological cause.\u201d<\/p>\n

As Hamas represents the government of the Palestinian people of Gaza, the murder of thousands of Palestinian children by the Israeli government is, by definition, \u201ccriminal violence intended to intimidate a population [and] coerce a government.\u201d<\/em> If international law meant anything at all, the Israeli response to the Hamas Attack would also be called an act of \u201cterrorism.\u201d<\/p>\n

It isn\u2019t of course because \u201cinternational law\u201d is just a fabricated stick wielded by the powerful to oppress whomever. It enables governments to claim the \u201clegal authority\u201d to kill indiscriminately. When they can\u2019t obtain that \u201clegal\u201d approval the most powerful governments don\u2019t pay any heed to its absence and murder people anyway.<\/p>\n

Over the years, the Israeli government has completely ignored numerous binding and non-binding UN Security Council and General Assembly\u00a0resolutions<\/a>. So What? It doesn\u2019t mean anything. The application and enforcement of \u201cinternational law\u201d is as arbitrary as the designation of terrorist groups.<\/p>\n

The intergovernmental\u00a0consensus<\/em>\u00a0on \u201cterrorism,\u201d then, is an overtly political propaganda construct. \u201cMight is right\u201d is the full extent of this international\u00a0legalese<\/em>\u00a0drivel and labels like \u201cterrorist\u201d are stuck on some violent aggressors but not others for purely propagandist reasons.<\/p>\n

This does not excuse mass murder, such as that perpetrated by Hamas during its October 7th Attack. It is merely to point out that calling the Hamas Attack \u201cterrorism\u201d but then refusing to call Israeli barbarity \u201cterrorism\u201d is so hypocritical it renders the whole \u201cterrorism\u201d concept moot. We should either apply the terrorist designation to all, including governments, who systematically slaughter innocent people to cause \u201cextreme fear,\u201d or to none.<\/p>\n

Hamas Attack: Intelligence Failures?<\/strong><\/h2>\n

In October 2024 the Combating Terrorism Center (CTR) at the US West Point military training academy produced analysis of the Israeli Intelligence \u201cfailings\u201d that supposedly led to the \u201csurprise\u201d October 7th Hamas Attack. The CTR analysis provides us with a reasonably full\u00a0official account<\/a>:<\/p>\n

Hamas leaders themselves have noted the group\u2019s surprise at the ease with which its operatives breached the barrier separating the Gaza Strip from Israel, as well as the slowness of the Israeli response. [. . .] Israel misread Hamas\u2019 intentions. [. . .] Shin Bet [Israeli domestic intelligence \u2013 ISA] has been primarily responsible for HUMINT [human intelligence] in Gaza and Israel\u2019s Military Intelligence Directorate (AMAN) for SIGINT [signals intelligence]. Israel had managed to collect some information that could have been considered indicators pointing to the attack. [. . .] [F]or more than a year before October 7, the IDF had reportedly been in possession of a document, the \u201cJericho Wall\u201d file, that outlines a plan to invade Israel that largely corresponds to the October 7 events. [. . .] [I]n July 2023, a non-commissioned officer in AMAN\u2019s 8200 SIGINT unit warned that a recent exercise by the group \u201cclosely followed the Jericho Wall plan, and that Hamas was building the capacity to carry it out.\u201d [. . .] the Gaza Division subsequently prepared a document warning that Hamas was planning a large-scale invasion and intended to take up to 250 hostages. [. . .] Unit 8200 sent another warning to a number of IDF officers a few days before October 7, urging them to make preparations to minimize the impact of the expected attack. [. . .] [T]he head of AMAN\u2019s \u201cDevil\u2019s Advocate\u201d or \u201cRed Team\u201d unit [. . .] issued four warnings in the three weeks before October 7 that Hamas \u201cwould soon launch a confrontation with Israel, because it identified deep processes that were fundamentally changing the strategic situation.\u201d [. . .] [N]either Shin Bet nor AMAN were able to detect additional indicators and suspicious activities. [. . .] Israel\u2019s inability to detect the impending attacks was not the result of a single glaring failure but rather the result of multiple problems at different levels and across the various intelligence services and the top political and military echelons.<\/p>\n

The official narrative, then, is that despite the frankly massive amount of intelligence suggesting an attack was imminent, multiple intelligence \u201cfailures\u201d combined to enable Hamas to stroll through the Iron Wall [Gaza prison wall] defences and carry out their Attack.<\/p>\n

The CTR observation that \u201cneither Shin Bet nor AMAN were able to detect additional indicators\u201d<\/em> is pointless. Both Shin Bet and AMAN operatives gave ample warning and provided quite specific intelligence suggesting an attack was imminent. What need was there for any \u201cadditional indicators\u201d?<\/p>\n

As reported by the\u00a0New York Times<\/a>, and mentioned by the CTR, In April 2022 IDF military intelligence (AMAN) had come into possession of a Hamas strategic plan which AMAN code named \u201cJerricho Wall.\u201d This was the blueprint for the Hamas Attack. The NYT reported:<\/p>\n

Hamas followed the blueprint [Jericho Wall] with shocking precision. The document called for a barrage of rockets at the outset of the attack, drones to knock out the security cameras and automated machine guns along the border, and gunmen to pour into Israel en masse in paragliders, on motorcycles and on foot \u2014 all of which happened on Oct. 7.<\/p>\n

On September 12th, four weeks before the Attack, Hamas produced its customary \u201cStrong Pillar\u201d training exercise video. While this was an annual Hamas propaganda event, nonetheless it showed Hamas training for \u201cJerricho Wall.\u201d The Associated Press reported that the video\u00a0showed Hamas<\/a>:<\/p>\n

[U]sing explosives to blast through a replica of the border gate, sweep in on pickup trucks and then move building by building through a full-scale reconstruction of an Israeli town, firing automatic weapons at human-silhouetted paper targets.<\/p>\n

That no one in Israeli intelligence supposedly took any of this seriously is stretching \u201cfailure\u201d plausibility to breaking point. But even if it was attributable to failures, the suggestion that the Hamas Attack came as a \u201csurprise\u201d is idiotic.<\/p>\n

The Jewish Virtual library\u00a0reported<\/a>\u00a0that IDF intelligence chief Aharon Ze\u2019evi-Farkash acknowledged that \u201cJerricho Wall\u201d revealed that \u201cHamas was not deterred.\u201d<\/p>\n

Yet, in July 2023, when an AMAN Unit 8200 officer said that training exercises that looked just like \u201cJerricho Wall\u201d were escalating, adding that they did not look like preparation for \u201cjust a raid on a village\u201d but rather \u201ca plan designed to start a war,\u201d that too was ignored by the Israeli chain of command.<\/p>\n

It wasn\u2019t just Israeli intelligence that warned of an impending attack either. Menachem Gida, leader of a team of 26 Israeli hobbyists\u2014who routinely monitored Gaza\u2019s communications network\u2014repeatedly warned the IDF about the likely attack. They were openly discussing it on their \u201cField Security Operational Monitor\u201d WhatsApp group.<\/p>\n

The civilians\u00a0reportedly appraised<\/a>\u00a0the IDF, in the days leading up to the attack, that Hamas was \u201cpracticing the breaching of the fence and arriving from the sea, conquering kibbutzim such as Zikim, Netiv Ha\u2019asara and Nir Oz, seizing hostages and destroying everything.\u201d<\/p>\n

Yifat Ben Shoshan<\/a>, a resident of Netiv HaAsara and a tour guide for Israeli towns and Kibbutzim on the Gazan border, was interviewed by the Kan 11 radio station\u00a0a few days before<\/a>\u00a0the Hamas Attack. She said:<\/p>\n

I hope Hamas isn\u2019t planning a second Yom Kippur. [. . .] For years they had been gradually improving their capabilities, especially their rocket system. And they\u2019d been training for weeks right up against the border, sometimes in massive numbers. I tried to warn the officers, but they told me I didn\u2019t know anything about it and that I was safe.<\/p>\n

Shoshan recognised that the 50th anniversary of the\u00a0Yom Kippur War<\/a>, (October 6th 1973) when Egypt and Syria launched a \u201csurprise\u201d attack on Israel, was of particular symbolic significance for Hamas and represented a moment of heightened risk. Yet, we are told, no one in an Israeli position of authority managed to make this mental leap.<\/p>\n

Instead, the decision was made to concentrate 25 IDF Battalions in the West Bank and leave just 4 guarding Gaza over the anniversary period. On October 5th 2023, two elite commando companies were moved from Gaza to the West Bank, leaving just\u00a0600 regular IDF soldiers<\/a>\u00a0(conscripts) spread thinly along the Gazan border.<\/p>\n

Supposedly, the policy of arming Israeli settlers is to enable them to defend themselves against \u201cterrorist\u201d attacks, rather than kill unarmed Palestinians as often seems to be the case\u2014especially in the\u00a0West Bank<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Yet, in the years and months leading up to the Hamas Attack, civilians on the Gazan border, such as local security coordinators Rafi Babian, had protested vigorously against the IDF program of\u00a0removing weapons<\/a>\u00a0from southern border communities.<\/p>\n

As noted by West Point\u2019s CTR, AMAN Unit 8200 operatives operating in the Gazan Division gave\u00a0very precise warnings<\/a>\u00a0about the looming Hamas Attack, even down to accurate estimates of how many hostages they were planning to take. Military spotters and observers at places like the Nahal Oz observation room, and civilians alike, had evidently been reporting increasing Hamas activity. A Unit 8200 operative sent an email to her superiors just three weeks before the Attack\u00a0saying<\/a>:<\/p>\n

The sword is coming [. . .] warn the people. [. . .] The other side is determined in its intentions to carry out its plan. If the plan is implemented painful and difficult fighting is expected.<\/p>\n

Israeli government officials denied receiving intelligence alerts from\u00a0Egypt<\/a>\u00a0three days prior to the Hamas attack. Post the attack, this led Egypt\u2019s intelligence minister\u00a0to state<\/a>:<\/p>\n

We have warned them [Israeli intelligence] an explosion of the situation is coming, and very soon, and it would be big. But they underestimated such warnings.<\/p>\n

\u201cUnderestimated\u201d appears to be diplomatic code for \u201ccompletely ignored.\u201d<\/p>\n

All this intelligence perhaps explains why, the night before the Hamas Attack, IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar and Aharon Haliva, head of military intelligence, met to discuss why\u00a0Hamas was mobilising<\/a>. Although perhaps it doesn\u2019t because they didn\u2019t alert anyone nor try to strengthen any Israeli defences and took absolutely no precautionary measures whatsoever.<\/p>\n

In the weeks leading up to the Hamas Attack what \u201cadditional indicators\u201d did\u00a0any<\/em>\u00a0Israeli intelligence chief or military commander need to call for regional defences to be strengthened? Instead the process of weakening them continued.<\/p>\n

The Israeli news outlet\u00a0Haaretz wrote<\/a>:<\/p>\n

The IDF and Shin Bet had no intelligence warning to indicate Hamas\u2019 intention of invading Israel in large numbers. The Southern Command even allowed the transfer to the West Bank of three battalions who operated in the sector, in order to reinforce the troops there over the holiday.<\/p>\n

No intelligence warnings?<\/p>\n

Haaretz went on to say that on the day of the attack \u201cSouthern Command and the Gaza Regiment collapsed completely\u201d\u2014precisely because there weren\u2019t \u201cenough troops in the sector to deploy.\u201d It seems the skeleton cohort of remaining troops\u2014many of them women soldiers\u2014and the Israeli settlers in the region had been left practically undefended at exactly the wrong time.<\/p>\n

But the alleged intelligence \u201cfailures\u201d didn\u2019t stop there. In the years prior to the Hamas attack, Israeli intelligence capabilities over and within Gaza were eye-watering. Israel operates a\u00a0fleet of satellites<\/a>\u00a0enabling it to monitor Gaza from space. Ofek-13 SAR systems enabled it to view Gazans in all weather and cloud conditions, night and day, with a\u00a0ground resolution<\/a>\u00a0of 0.5m2.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0Hermes 900<\/a>\u00a0drones, with both electro-optical (EO) and infra-red (IR) sensors, thermal surveillance monitors, laser designation targeting and electronic listening devices, were just one of a number of Israeli drone systems deployed over Gaza prior to the Hamas Attack. The\u00a0Cyclone drone system<\/a>\u00a0was used both for spying and for crowd control.<\/p>\n

In 2021 Israel was the first country to deploy an AI-controlled\u00a0drone swarm<\/a>\u00a0to locate, identify and attack its enemies. Israel\u2019s drone surveillance of Gaza was so pervasive it led Gazans to complain of\u00a0sleep deprivation<\/a>\u00a0due to the persistent \u201cbuzz\u201d in the skies above their heads.<\/p>\n

Israel\u2019s cyber and electronic warfare capabilities were just as comprehensive. Again, in 2021, the US administration banned the commercial use of Israeli defence contractor NSO\u2019s\u00a0Pegasus spyware<\/a>. It was able to hack pretty much any internet-enabled device\u2014particularly mobile phones\u2014through various software vulnerabilities. Pegasus could harvest personal and location data, control a mobile phone\u2019s microphones and cameras\u2014without the user\u2019s knowledge or permission\u2014and transmit data even after the user has switched the phone off.<\/p>\n

Israel\u2019s human (on the ground \u2013 HUMINT) intelligence prowess was equally formidable. Shin Bet HUMINT led the IDF to frequently intercept and shut down Hamas\u00a0border tunnels<\/a>. Shin Bet\u2019s infiltration of Hamas\u2019 literal underground network was so\u00a0exhaustive<\/a>, and Hamas so destabilised, that Hamas resorted to mass\u00a0executions\u00a0<\/a>of suspected spies and possible collaborators. Shin Bet\u2019s\u00a0Mista\u2019arvim counter-terrorism unit<\/a>\u00a0and the IDF\u2019s elite Maglan unit were able to conduct\u00a0targeted assassinations<\/a>\u00a0and many other acts of espionage and surveillance inside\u00a0Gaza<\/a>.<\/p>\n

In addition to all of this, the Palestinians were the most surveilled and searched people\u00a0on Earth<\/a>. Everyone who entered or or left Gaza was subjected to the \u201cBlue Wolf\u201d system. Biometric ID, monitored by\u00a0facial recognition<\/a>\u00a0software, combined with strictly controlled entry and exit permits were required at the armed checkpoints that were the only\u00a0official<\/em>\u00a0way in an out of Gaza. The \u201cBlue Wolf\u201d system logged every movement on what Israeli intelligence operatives called \u201cFacebook for Palestinians<\/a>.\u201d So extensive and intrusive was Israel\u2019s spying on Palestinians that, in 2014, former members of Israel\u2019s\u00a0Unit 8200<\/a>\u00a0wrote a joint letter to the Israeli government protesting the\u00a0oppressive surveillance<\/a>.<\/p>\n

All of this electronic surveillance and human intelligence was scrutinised by the\u00a0IDF Unit 9900<\/a>. The Gaza-specific battlefield intelligence collection unit analysed the harvested data before deploying units of its Gaza Division, under IDF Southern Command, to strike Hamas and other \u201cterrorist\u201d targets.<\/p>\n

There is absolutely no evidence at all to suggest the Israeli authorities decided to stop Satellite, cyber, SIGINT and HUMINT intelligence gathering in, around and above Gaza in the years\u00a0leading up<\/a>\u00a0to the Hamas Attack. If the official narrative of intelligence \u201cfailures\u201d is to be believed, however, then all of it must have \u201cfailed\u201d completely\u2026for years.<\/p>\n

Ali Baraka, the head of external relations for Hamas, said that preparations for the Hamas Attack took\u00a0two years<\/a>. Given the complexity and scale of the Hamas Attack this seems reasonable. If so, it implies that, for two years, Hamas commanders\u2014most of its leaders lived in Doha but commanders like Mohammed Deif operated inside Gaza\u2014met to formulate and communicate Hamas plans as required. Hamas issued the corresponding orders, assembled, trained and equipped its forces, gathered and stored the munitions and equipment needed for the large-scale assault and somehow managed to do all of this without once triggering a single Israeli intelligence alert.<\/p>\n

What is even more remarkable is that immediately after the Hamas Attack, Israel\u2019s vice like intelligence grip of anything that moves in Gaza was suddenly working again.<\/p>\n

By 11th November 2023, Shin Bet operatives were deep inside Hamas territory\u00a0directing IDF strikes<\/a>\u00a0and coordinating assassinations. It seems the monstrous Israeli intelligence machine only failed totally\u2014in every single conceivable regard\u2014in respect to the October 7th Hamas Attack.<\/p>\n

Hamas, by comparison, supposedly suffered\u00a0no such<\/a>\u00a0catastrophic intelligence failures. They apparently used the cheap drones they probably bought from Amazon to make quite precise maps and gather targeting information for their October 7th Attack. Flying their little drones over highly sensitive Israeli military installations for days, with ease, they also gathered HUMINT from Israeli labourers who passed to-and-fro, across the Gaza border, without one Israeli intelligence officer thinking to ask any labourer what they were chatting to Hamas about. Or so we are told.<\/p>\n

So, it appears Hamas was spying on Israeli military targets with abandon and training out in the open in large numbers next to the wall; Israeli civilians living near the Gazan border knew an attack was likely and, indeed, imminent and said so; numerous Israeli intelligence operatives issued highly accurate alerts; foreign intelligence agencies knew what was about to happen and told Israeli government officials about it; the Israeli government had a dossier outlining the precise plan\u2014Jericho Wall\u2014and Hamas even broadcast a video showing themselves training to execute that plan just weeks before carrying it out.<\/p>\n

In addition, Gazan\u2019s were relentlessly surveilled, their movement monitored and controlled. Intelligence operatives were evidently working inside Gaza and it was under intense scrutiny at all times by an almost unbelievable array of spy satellites, drones, bugs, cyber-surveillance and a smorgasbord of Israeli SIGINT tools.<\/p>\n

But the Hamas Attack came as a complete surprise and no one in Israeli authority was prepared to defend against it.<\/p>\n

One of the\u00a0excuses<\/a>\u00a0given, evidently in hope of explaining the inexplicable \u201cfailures,\u201d is that Israel\u2019s over-reliance on technology and AI led it to undervalue information gathered from traditional human intelligence (HUMINT). This is not a plausible argument.<\/p>\n

The overwhelming weight of evidence shows that neither Israeli technological surveillance-based intelligence nor human intelligence was lacking. There was no \u201cfailure\u201d of human intelligence-gathering. Intelligence operatives, military observers and even civilian volunteers knew what was happening and did everything they could to raise the alarm.<\/p>\n

The are only two viable explanations. Either everything that is known about Israeli intelligence capabilities is wrong and Israeli intelligence is actually worse than useless, or high-level decisions were made to deliberately ignore\u00a0<\/em>intelligence warnings.<\/p>\n

As we shall see in Part 3, the manner in which Israeli forces responded on the day only adds further evidence that indicates the October 7th Hamas Attack was\u2014from the Israeli perspective\u2014at the very least, a LIHOP false flag operation, which appears to have strayed into MIHOP on more than one occasion.<\/p>\n

—<\/p>\n

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Despite numerous warnings, the IDF withdrew two elite commando companies from Gaza on Oct 5, 2025, leaving the Gaza perimeter dangerously undermanned. Iain Davis explains why what happened on Oct 7 wasn\u2019t an \u201cintelligence failure\u201d but was allowed to happen <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":39262,"featured_media":274178,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_et_pb_use_builder":"","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[88,118],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-312715","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-false-flag-attacks","category-7-10-gaza-war"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/312715","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/39262"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=312715"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/312715\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":312717,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/312715\/revisions\/312717"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/274178"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=312715"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=312715"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=312715"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}