Military recruitment poster in Kiev<\/p>\n
Long considered an official mouthpiece for the elite, the London-based Economist has been forced to admit the situation in Ukraine isn\u2019t looking too bright. Before it makes this admission though, the Economist softens up readers with some prime disinformation.<\/p>\n
This comes in the form of a sub-headline, which reads:<\/p>\n
There is no reference or source quoted to substantiate this claim. We are simply supposed to take the Economist’s word that Russian casualties are \u201cimmense\u201d, without any evidence.<\/p>\n
In reality, Russian casualties are probably far less than Ukraine\u2019s. That\u2019s because the Russians have been defending against a Ukrainian counter offensive. Thus the Russians have no need to unnecessarily sacrifice their troops who are dug in to heavily fortified positions.<\/p>\n
While the Ukrainians, who now have no air support and little artillery have been ordered to take Russian positions in what many Ukrainian troops view as \u201csuicide missions<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n To make matters worse, many of Ukraine\u2019s new recruits are poorly trained and often poorly armed too.<\/p>\n It\u2019s a recipe for “immense casualties.”<\/p>\n Still, that doesn\u2019t stop The Economist from dishing up the disinformation. So after revealing that things aren\u2019t going too well for Ukraine militarily, it adds that the Russian Armed Forces are also trying to recruit more men. What The Economist plays down however, is that this is part of a major expansion of Russia\u2019s armed forces<\/a>.<\/p>\n These new recruits won\u2019t be conscripts, like the Ukrainian recruits, but full time professional soldiers. There is a BIG difference.<\/p>\n In fact, much of what The Economist accuses the Russians of is probably more descriptive of the Ukrainians.<\/p>\n For example, The Economist claims that the Russians have a tactic:<\/p>\n \u201cof hurling vast numbers of men at defended positions, often without proper equipment\u201d<\/p>\n Of course, in the real world Moscow has absolutely no need to make such sacrifices.<\/p>\n Finally, The Economist closes this little exercise in disinformation by portraying the Ukrainian leadership in glowing terms:<\/p>\n Mr Zelensky is also driven by more noble concerns. \u201cZelensky wants to do the right thing by Ukrainians,\u201d says a high-level government source.<\/p>\n As the following first four paragraphs reveal, Ukraine is facing real problems. It doesn’t have sufficient troops and those that it does have are not properly trained, equipped or even motivated to fight the Russians. In short, the West’s plan to dismember Russia into a group of rival states using Ukraine as a proxy for the task, has failed.<\/p>\n What happens next is anyone’s guess but Russia’s recent military recruitment drive should make the West nervous. Even with proxies doing the fighting and dying, the West has proved itself totally inadequate in its confrontation with Russia.<\/p>\n Finally, whoever wrote the following article is extremely limited in their grasp of what is happening. For example, they write:<\/p>\n Elsewhere, the Kremlin has been able to meet its minimum needs with secret recruitment for a full-scale war that it still pretends is not happening.<\/p>\n As reputable military commentators like Douglas Macgregor<\/a> and Scott Ritter<\/a> have pointed out, Russia has effectively won this war. So Moscow may not be preparing for further fighting in Ukraine because that conflict may be coming to an end. Instead, Putin may be preparing for a possible conflict with those that supported, armed and equipped Ukraine in its confrontation with Russia, the West. Ed.<\/p>\n The new recruits came from a variety of backgrounds, but they shared one thing: after rudimentary training in western Europe, none of them expected to be deployed to an assault unit at the hottest section of the Ukrainian front line. Some had signed up voluntarily, thinking they would to be given places in units that suited their profiles: as drone operators or artillery men. Others were plucked from their villages with little warning. One older recruit didn\u2019t even have the chance to pick up his false teeth. After less than a week in the trenches of the Donbas, in eastern Ukraine, the platoon of 20 had been reduced by six. Three had been killed in action, three seriously wounded.<\/p>\n This is one of the worst recruitment stories, but it is far from isolated. Ukraine is desperately looking to plug its front lines against new Russian attacks. No army offers new recruits guarantees about where they will be deployed, let alone in wartime, and the assault brigades are among the most desperate units.<\/p>\n But what lawyers describe as a \u201cdeployment lottery\u201d is straining the recruitment process. Army chiefs are struggling to fill places with the willing; some are resorting to conscription raids on gyms and shopping centres. Few of those who are signed up this way make good soldiers. \u201cWe\u2019re seeing 45- to 47-year-olds,\u201d complains one senior officer. \u201cThey are out of breath by the time they reach the front line.\u201d<\/p>\n Recognising the problem, in September Ukraine\u2019s defence ministry began work on a new mobilisation strategy. Illarion Pavliuk, a spokesman for the ministry, says part of the problem lies in the army\u2019s success: many citizens no longer view the war in the existential terms they did immediately after Russia\u2019s invasion in February 2022. \u201cSome mistakenly think there is someone else who can do the job for them,\u201d he says.<\/p>\n The reforms aim to give those who are wavering more choice: new recruits can, more or less, sign up for a specific position. A new digital register will improve the ministry\u2019s understanding of Ukraine\u2019s manpower resources. There will be a clearer system of rest and rotations. Eventually, volunteers will be mobilised for a finite period, not indefinitely as is the case now.<\/p>\n There are several examples of successful recruitment campaigns into individual units. The 3rd Assault Brigade, created nine months into the war as a branch of Ukraine\u2019s special forces, is perhaps the most visible. Skyscraper-sized adverts in Ukraine\u2019s cities glamorise life as one of the brigade\u2019s stormtroopers, slaying goblin-like caricatures of evil. But no less important is the brigade\u2019s reputation for competent command, good equipment and low attrition rates. New recruits typically undergo months of training, unlike the one-month standard.<\/p>\n Khrystyna Bondarenko, a spokesperson for the brigade, says it has no shortage of volunteers. By the start of next year the brigade will be Ukraine\u2019s largest, she says, at around the size of a NATO division. (Ukraine\u2019s army does not have divisions.) The majority of its new recruits are under 25, and she turns down 150 applications a month from minors. \u201cNo one is saying there are millions of people waiting to fight in Avdiivka [a town in the Donbas that has recently seen fierce fighting],\u201d she says. \u201cBut there are people you can work with.\u201d<\/p>\n Russia, too, is having difficulty mobilising the troops it needs<\/a>. Its tactic of hurling vast numbers of men at defended positions, often without proper equipment, can mean daily losses as high as 1,000 men<\/a>. But the fundamentals point to a gargantuan challenge for Ukraine. With a pool of potential soldiers about four times greater, Russia looks favoured in the long run. In its prisons and poorest areas, joining the army looks rational.<\/p>\n Elsewhere, the Kremlin has been able to meet its minimum needs with secret recruitment for a full-scale war that it still pretends is not happening. If it did need to ramp up its mobilisation the Kremlin would need to admit that Russia is at war. That would not be without political consequences.<\/p>\n Ukrainian critics of the government in Kyiv, meanwhile, charge that the country is only \u201cpretending to mobilise.\u201d Viktor Kevlyuk, a retired colonel who oversaw the implementation of mobilisation policy for the western half of the country from 2014\u2014when Russia first invaded\u2014to 2021, says Ukraine risks falling into a trap. Russia will step up its mobilisation after its presidential election in March is over, he thinks. (HUR, Ukraine\u2019s military-intelligence agency, agrees.)<\/p>\n Vladimir Putin has already signed an edict increasing the size of Russia\u2019s armed forces by 170,000. Colonel Kevlyuk argues that Ukraine must respond with a nationwide mobilisation of industry, government and resources. The often-decadent lifestyles of those enjoying safety in Kyiv need to change, he thinks. \u201cThis is not a time for imported smoked salmon.\u201d<\/p>\n Throughout the war Volodymyr Zelensky has resisted the maximalist urgings of his soldiers, much to their chagrin. His top generals have, for example, pushed to lower the age at which non-reservists can be mobilised, which currently stands at 27. Others have proposed a stricter implementation of mobilisation laws.<\/p>\n The president has pushed back partly for political reasons: he does not want to irritate the population unnecessarily. But Mr Zelensky is also driven by more noble concerns. \u201cZelensky wants to do the right thing by Ukrainians,\u201d says a high-level government source. \u201cHe doesn\u2019t want to be a dictator\u201d.<\/p>\n Tough decisions lie ahead. For Colonel Kevlyuk, the army is a beast that must be fed: \u201cWe have no choice other than to be bloodthirsty,\u201d he says. But some officials prefer a more consensual approach. The high-level source predicts media campaigns promoting national sacrifice and warning that Russia continues to pose an existential threat. \u201cIf we lose, it will be bad for all of us,\u201d he says.<\/p>\n The task is to convince potential recruits. \u201cConductor\u201d, one of the men deployed to the ill-fated unit in the Donbas, says he is committed to serving his country, \u201cbut only in a way that can be useful\u201d. In the meantime he is occupied \u201c24\/7\u201d in securing a transfer away from the assault forces. \u201cYou can\u2019t just write people\u2019s lives off like this,\u201d he says.<\/p>\nUkraine\u2019s army is struggling to find good recruits<\/strong><\/h1>\n
Russia is suffering immense casualties\u2014but it has the edge in manpower<\/h2>\n
The Economist \u2013 Dec 17, 2023<\/strong><\/h2>\n