{"id":241949,"date":"2021-09-01T07:40:08","date_gmt":"2021-09-01T07:40:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/?p=241949"},"modified":"2021-09-03T06:30:20","modified_gmt":"2021-09-03T06:30:20","slug":"30-years-after-communism-fell-putin-offers-alternative-to-globalism-thats-why-our-ruling-class-hates-him","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/?p=241949","title":{"rendered":"30 Years After Communism Fell, Putin Offers Alternative to Globalism. That’s Why Our Ruling Class Hates Him"},"content":{"rendered":"

Wayne Allensworth \u2013 The Unz Review Aug 31, 2021<\/strong><\/h1>\n

Thirty years ago this month, Communist hardliners<\/a> in the Soviet Union launched the \u201cAugust Coup<\/a>\u201d against Mikhail Gorbachev\u2019s reformist government. It failed and instead the Communist Party itself was suppressed, after 74 years of totalitarian power. Hopefully the current communist coup in the U.S. will similarly fail<\/a>\u2014but it\u2019s worth examining why our managerial globalist regime enabling it retains a hatred for Russian\u2019s current ruler, President Vladimir Putin, that is as intense as it seems inexplicable.<\/p>\n

From \u201cRussiagate<\/a>\u201d to charges that anti-globalists<\/a> are shilling for Putin, the shrill accusations of Russia being behind every nefarious activity<\/a> the global managers can imagine, to the comparisons<\/a> of Putin to Hitler<\/a>\u2026On and on the trail of hatred goes, for fear is behind it.<\/p>\n

Understanding the obsessive fear and loathing of Putin\u2019s Russia requires historical memory, something our society is woefully short on, but it\u2019s necessary for anyone seeking such understanding to back up to the end of the Cold War and recall the circumstances that gave rise to globalism.<\/p>\n

The Fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War<\/strong><\/em><\/h2>\n

The Berlin Wall fell in 1989. The Soviet Union remained standing, but was fragile,<\/a> reeling from Gorbachev\u2019s policies of glasnost<\/em> (\u201copenness\u201d) and perestroika<\/em> (\u201crestructuring\u201d), which had unleashed a firestorm of previously pent-up popular frustrations. The Soviet economy was in shambles. The Soviets were losing<\/a> their Eastern European satellites and nationalism was pulling the USSR apart at the seams.<\/p>\n

I used to find it exceedingly difficult to explain to Americans the chaos and despair in Russia that followed the Soviet collapse.<\/a> But with our country following its own path to self-destruction, perhaps that will no longer be the case. As the state and economy collapsed, their money worthless, their jobs evaporating, with crime, disorder, and corruption rampant, life expectancy plummeted<\/a> in post-Soviet Russia. The longstanding Russian curse, alcoholism, became an endemic phenomenon in Russian life. Abortions substantially exceeded births<\/a>, suicides soared<\/a>, and the state apparatus and law enforcement collapsed along with the unkept utopian promises of a failed system.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>The rug had been pulled from under the feet of the Russian people, the narod <\/em>who had suffered so greatly, but who had felt pride in Soviet achievements\u2014Yuri Gagarin<\/a> and the Soviet space program,<\/a> the country\u2019s superpower status, and above all, their victory over Fascism in the Great Patriotic War.<\/a> Now that was all apparently gone with the wind, and the proud Russians had to rely on Western aid, including aid from the International Monetary Fund<\/a>, to survive, however unsteadily, however forlorn.<\/p>\n

Nearly one year after the great collapse, your faithful observer was in Vladivostok<\/a>, in Russia\u2019s Far East. Vladivostok was formerly the home of the Soviet Pacific Fleet<\/a>. At the time, the rusting hulks of the newly formed Russian navy were abandoned in their docks, listing and lifeless. I walked past them on a cold day in November, and they looked like bizarre modern sculptures, unguarded, unwanted, a gallery with an audience of one.<\/p>\n

At the naval base on nearby Russky Island<\/a>, Russian sailors had gone unfed, as their officers failed to provide rations for months. A number of them starved to death.<\/p>\n

A winter storm had frozen the port city on the Sea of Japan\u2019s Bay of the Golden Horn<\/a>. The streets were covered with ice and packed snow, the power grid failed, and without heat, the residents of Vladivostok had begun dismantling wooden structures to burn to warm themselves. Police were deployed to stop the city from descending into chaos. They were supposed to arrest the people carrying off fence planks and other wood they had gathered, but they often ignored them.<\/p>\n

As I left the unguarded naval docks, I trudged through the snow and ice, and noticed an old woman pulling a sled loaded with wooden planks. I pulled the sled up an incline for her. She crossed herself and blessed me, and I noticed a militia officer\u2014a policeman\u2014casually turning his head and pretending not to see.<\/p>\n

A week later I was in Moscow. Beggars were quite common: amputees, destitute pensioners, old war veterans wearing their threadbare uniforms and tarnished medals, the very old and the very young, as armies of orphans took to the streets<\/a> of Russian cities. Street vendors, often educated people who had worked in industry or for the state apparatus, hawked all sorts of cheap goods<\/a>, often Chinese <\/a>in origin, on the sidewalks of the dingy capital\u2019s streets.<\/p>\n

Through it all, I noted the good will of many of the Russians I met, people who seemed glad that the Cold War was behind us.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>That emotional warmth would not survive the \u201cshock therapy<\/a>\u201d economic policies of the Russian government that, on the recommendation of Western advisors, had gone all in on neo-liberal reforms, lifting price controls and beginning the massive selloff of Soviet era assets. Gradualists<\/a> had warned that the country might collapse under the strain, and it nearly did. The political and economic dislocations that followed the Soviet collapse, along with the unpopular economic policies (\u201cshock without therapy<\/a>\u201c) helped ignite a political conflict between President Boris Yeltsin and the legislature, the Russian Supreme Soviet, that would end with a mini-civil war in Moscow<\/a>, when tanks commanded by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev (the tank crews were reluctant to take such orders from lower ranking officers) blasted the parliament into submission in October,1993.<\/p>\n

The \u201cWild 90s\u201d traumatized the Russian people in ways Westerners failed to fully understand at the time. And they also failed to account for historic Russian distrust of the West\u2014the flipside of the good will I had seen so much of early on in Yeltsin-era Russia. By the end of the 90s, with NATO intervening in the ruins of Yugoslavia<\/a>, bombing, among other sites, targets in Serbia<\/a>, a traditional Russian ally, even Yeltsin had had enough and made his displeasure known to \u201cfriend Bill,\u201d as he called President Clinton, to no avail.<\/p>\n

Russia, humiliated in its war with Chechen separatists<\/a>, would soon face the prospect of NATO expanding eastward toward Russia\u2019s borders, though the Russians thought they been promised this would not happen<\/a>. Relations with the West would continue to go downhill for some time. But a turning point, though few realized it at the time, was reached when an ailing Yeltsin resigned<\/a> on New Year\u2019s Eve, 1999, elevating Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to the presidency.<\/p>\n

Western triumphalism and globalization<\/strong><\/em><\/h2>\n

The fall of the Berlin Wall<\/a> in 1989 was a seminal moment in Cold War history. To all intents and purposes, the Cold War with the Soviets was over. We would later hear talk of a post-Cold War \u201cpeace dividend<\/a>,\u201d a return to normal relations with the countries of the world and, hopefully, a much smaller military budget and a decrease in the vast array of American defense commitments made during the \u201ctwilight struggle\u201d with Communism. Some of us looked forward to a time when Americans could set down the heavy burden President Kennedy had urged us to take up in his inaugural address<\/a>. We had borne the burden of doing battle for \u201cthe free world,\u201d and it appeared that there was at least a fair chance that America would come home.<\/p>\n

It was not to be.<\/p>\n

1989 also saw the publication of an essay<\/a> by Francis Fukuyama in The National Interest<\/em>, an essay that would become a widely discussed book, one that was a blueprint of sorts\u2014at least in a cruder, simplified form\u2014for globalism<\/a>. The book, published in 1992, was The End of History and the Last Man.<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n

What Fukuyama posited wasn\u2019t that all struggle, strife, and achievement\u2014what most of us think of as \u201chistory\u201d\u2014would end, but that human development had reached an end point: the apex of the evolution of mankind\u2019s social, economic, and political development had been attained in liberal democracy.<\/p>\n

Market economics was the most efficient method of producing material wellbeing. There simply wasn\u2019t anything else. The Cold War had been a struggle of alternative developmental models and democratic capitalism had won\u2014now the rest of the world would, perhaps in fits and starts, accept that as the only viable developmental path.<\/p>\n

So went the theory.<\/p>\n

Foreign policy realists and old-fashioned patriots might have mocked Fukuyama (and probably partly misunderstood what he was saying). But their real failure had been to misunderstand the nature of the Cold War itself. Traditionalists had viewed the battle as one against \u201cgodless Communism,\u201d a fight to protect traditional values and social-economic structures. However, they had allied themselves with a Liberal-Left nexus that tightened its hold in the West with a victory in another war\u2014the war against Nazism and Fascism.<\/p>\n

The victory in that war solidified liberalism\u2019s ideological triumph in the West, and further extended its cultural and social reach in popular entertainment, education, and the corporate world. A \u201clong march\u201d of the Liberal-Left through the institutions would marginalize\u2014and later, practically outlaw\u2014anything that even vaguely resembled a genuine Right in America. \u201cFascism,\u201d which the Liberal-Left took to mean any manifestations of what they considered dangerous atavistic impulses like patriotism and religious and social conservatism, had been defeated. The Right was on \u201cthe wrong side of history,\u201d as the defeat of Nazism and Fascism had shown. Any doubts about the developmental vector of the West and the world in general was deemed suspect by a globalist elite (and its minions in mass media) that was taking shape well before the Cold War was over.<\/p>\n

The passage of the Hart-Celler Immigration Act of 1965<\/a> was a key point in the evolution of the Left-Liberal managerial regime during the Cold War. Opening the immigration flood gates was part of the Cold War architecture of the era. The propaganda aspect of the Cold War was fought in ideological terms as a clash between Communism and Capitalism (\u201cthe Free World\u201d), a war of ideas, not of countries with concrete national interests and distinct peoples. Hart-Celler, which opened the door to non-European immigration, was an ideological extension of the Civil Rights legislation of the era, which was used in Cold War information campaigns to counter Soviet anti-capitalist and anti-U.S. propaganda<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Discrimination of any kind was viewed by US elites as arming the Communists with useful propaganda points\u2014a Western democracy discriminating against the colored peoples of the earth undermined the global anti-Communist line.<\/p>\n

Universalist language in American political discourse wasn\u2019t anything new, but the Cold War went a long way toward promoting America as an idea, not a real place or a people with national interests to defend.<\/p>\n

Thus, a global elite spawned during the Cold War, bolstered by Cold War era ideological abstractions, had consolidated its stranglehold on power in the Western world. The United States wasn\u2019t exactly the leader of \u201cthe Free World,\u201d but, rather, had become the seat of an expansive globalist project.<\/p>\n

The Military-Industrial Complex had interests of its own, and peace wasn\u2019t one of them. Globalist billionaires and the \u201cDeep State\u201d had become the not-so-Hidden Hands that manipulated \u201cdemocracy\u201d for their own ends. Ending the global \u201cgeopolitical architecture\u201d that was established during the Cold War would be a direct, existential threat to their power.<\/p>\n

\u201cGlobalization<\/a>\u201d was a popular media buzzword even before the Internet made a truly inter-connected world possible. The collapse of Soviet Communism, increased global \u201cmigration,\u201d and \u201cfree trade\u201d agreements, together with the expansion of transnational corporations, global air travel, and cellular communications, facilitated the realization of the One World dream of a transnational system. Internationalism, dating back at least to the failed League of Nations<\/a>, became transnationalism as global technological infrastructure evolved.<\/p>\n

\u201cPutinism\u201d as an alternative developmental model (\u201cCold War II\u201d)<\/strong><\/em><\/h2>\n

Another mistake traditional patriots made at the end of the Cold War: believing\u2014inadvertently echoing Fukuyama\u2014that the great ideological battles of the 20th<\/sup> Century were over and that \u201cwe\u201d had won. They missed the fact that their own reason for fighting the Cold War was not shared by an internationalist elite\u2014and that this elite\u2019s ideology had morphed into a nascent form of globalism.<\/p>\n

As James Burnham had theorized in The Managerial Revolution<\/em><\/a> (1941), mid-20th<\/sup> century economic, technical, and political power had fallen into the hands of a technocratic elite, the \u201cmanagers\u201d who also oversaw rival forms of the managerial system in Fascist and Communist regimes. The battle among them was one for global hegemony. So \u201cwe,\u201d traditional patriots, did not win the Cold War. \u201cOur\u201d managerial elite notched a victory over their rivals.<\/p>\n

As Burnham wrote, the \u201cfree enterprise system\u201d was no longer the venue of bourgeois proprietors, but of corporate managers. Together with their counterparts in mass media, the educational system, and the bureaucracy, this managerial, technocratic elite comprised our permanent government.<\/p>\n

Godless capitalism had triumphed over godless Communism.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>By the end of Yeltsin\u2019s presidency, Russia\u2019s traditional suspicions of the West had been re-ignited, and the man Boris Yeltsin chose to succeed him, Vladimir Putin, would fight another war with the Chechens<\/a>, preserve the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, and revive the Russian state apparatus. He curbed the influence of prominent Yeltsin-era \u201coligarchs<\/a>,\u201d and, with some luck (especially rising oil prices<\/a> that had tanked under Yeltsin), improved Russian living standards.<\/p>\n

Most importantly of all, those developments boosted sagging national pride. Russians value order above all, something that is understandable considering their turbulent history, and Russian identity is strongly connected to great power status. As their country became a player in world affairs once more, Russians again felt pride in their homeland. Higher living standards<\/a> and revived national pride, along with at least a semblance of order, were the bedrocks that Putin built his popular support on.<\/p>\n

The malaise that had afflicted the country under Yeltsin, and on into the early 2000s, dissipated under Putin. He proved to be a skillful player in the game of factional politics, as he used his connections with a number of Russia\u2019s influence groups (\u201cclans<\/a>\u201c) to create a balance among them. Elites could breathe easier\u2014assassinations of top-level players in politics and business became far less common. Many ordinary Russians could afford consumer items, vacations, a car, even foreign travel. A sort of tentative optimism, for Russians are a fatalistic people, reshaped Russian reality\u2014today, life expectancy<\/a> in Russia is about 74 years, up from 65.5 in 2000. Life expectancy for Russian men<\/a> has soared from about 58 in the 90\u2019s to 68 years.<\/p>\n

The bargain struck between vlast <\/em>(the authorities) and Russian society was derzhavnost <\/em>(great power status) and a measure of prosperity, in exchange for a limited \u201cmanaged democracy\u201d and \u201cstability.\u201d Since most ordinary Russians believed politics to be none of their business and enjoyed a new world of consumption (albeit quite limited by Western standards), it seemed a good tradeoff.<\/p>\n

To be sure, after more than twenty years of power, the \u201cnew\u201d has worn off the Putin system, and recent events (especially pension reform<\/a> that raised Russians\u2019 retirement age, as well as inflation that has eroded real incomes<\/a>), together with weariness with Putin\u2019s extremely wealthy cronies (a number of the Yeltsin-era \u201coligarchs<\/a>\u201d were displaced by Putin-connected magnates<\/a> who control vast state and quasi-state enterprises), has increased discontent in Russian society. The perennial Russian problems of bureaucratic incompetence and corruption are as prevalent as ever.<\/p>\n

Yet popular protests have never gelled into a countrywide movement directed against the Kremlin, despite the best efforts of the \u201cnon-systemic opposition<\/a>,\u201d whose best-known<\/a> leader, Aleksey Navalny,<\/a> is now serving a prison term.<\/a> A crackdown on opposition media outlets and the forced exile of a number of other opposition figures, together with the Kremlin administration\u2019s control over \u201csystemic\u201d political parties, has prevailed, at least for now.<\/p>\n

At the same time, \u201cPutinism\u201d has resisted<\/a> the incursion of what we now call Woke ideology. A law banning \u201chomosexual propaganda<\/a>\u201d is indicative of policies that earned Russia and Putin<\/a> the ire of the \u201cglobal community.\u201d When friends have asked your faithful servant why the global elites hate Putin with such visceral intensity, my usual reply has been \u201cNo gay pride parades in Moscow.\u201d<\/p>\n

That\u2019s an oversimplification, of course. Russia, for instance, has forcefully re-asserted its might in its traditional sphere of influence. The 2014 annexation of Crimea<\/a> sparked a wave of anti-Russian sanctions<\/a> by Western governments and general hysteria<\/a> in the West over \u201cRussian expansionism.\u201d A series of attacks on and assassinations<\/a> of Russian exiles has not endeared the Kremlin to the West, and not without reason.<\/p>\n

Yet the myopic globalists, totally lacking self-awareness, failed to acknowledge that their hegemonic aspirations of homogenizing the planet as defined by their ideological precepts were themselves, by definition, expansionist. Russia\u2019s sharp reaction to post-Cold War Western\/globalist triumphalism, which interpreted the fall of the Soviet Union as opening the door to globalist expansion across the vast Russian sprawl in Eurasia, was entirely predictable.<\/p>\n

As it turned out, a great \u201ctwilight struggle\u201d between opposing worldviews was not over, something many of us failed to understand in 1991. \u201cCold War II<\/a>\u201d is the follow on<\/a> to Cold War I<\/a>, just as the Cold War itself was a spinoff from World War II.<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cLiberal democracy\u201d vs. \u201cnationalist authoritarianism\u201d<\/strong><\/em><\/h2>\n

In short, Vladimir Putin\u2019s brand of quasi-democratic national conservatism, blended with an authoritarian cult of personality (albeit a mild one by Russian standards\u2014Putin is hardly an autocrat, as he is hemmed in by commitments to powerful interest groups) and suppression of potential anti-Kremlin rivals; Russia\u2019s revival as a world power; the rejection of Woke politics and \u201chomosexual propaganda\u201d; the revival of the Orthodox Church as a force in Russian life (though the Church\u2019s spiritual influence over its flock is more apparent than real<\/a>); as well as Russian actions in the \u201cNear Abroad\u201d (the 2008 war with Georgia<\/a> and the annexation of Crimea<\/a>, for instance); and the promotion of a \u201cmulti-polar<\/a>\u201d world, with Russia moving closer to China<\/a> to balance a globalist West, have made Putin the face of what globalists interpret as an alternative developmental model<\/em>\u2014one that rejects the End of History triumphalism that once swept globalist circles.<\/p>\n

The Putin-controlled Kremlin has enriched the president\u2019s cronies. But has proved wise enough not to empty state coffers, distributing enough income from oil and natural gas exports to raise Russian living standards. Putin has effectively played the role of \u201cthe good Czar,\u201d descending from on high to take on ordinary Russians\u2019 day-to-day complaints (access to natural gas lines for heating, local officials\u2019 broken promises, health care for remote areas, the list goes on and on) in what Russian media dubbed \u201cmanual control<\/a>\u201d mode.<\/p>\n

Vladimir Putin himself is everything globalists hate\u2014he\u2019s a perfect \u201cpatriarchal\u201d foil for Woke ideology and zealous globalists.<\/p>\n

What\u2019s more, as globalists see it,\u201dPutinism<\/a>,\u201d in the form of populist pushback against globalism, has also reared its head in the UK\u2019s Brexit vote<\/a>, in Viktor Orban\u2019s<\/a> conservative Hungarian nationalism<\/a>, and, most of all, in the person of Donald J. Trump.<\/p>\n

Of course, the notion that Trump, a weak president who couldn\u2019t manage the White House, much less \u201cDrain The Swamp,\u201d was an authoritarian Strong Man is laughable. But it\u2019s predictable given the mentality of the globalists and their Leftist allies. For them, any support for traditional values and patriotism is by definition \u201cauthoritarian.\u201d Traditional social structures (the nuclear family, marriage, churches) are themselves deemed anti-egalitarian, and thus, oppressive and archaic. \u201cDemocracy\u201d means adhering to the precepts of a globo-Leftist worldview and its utopian ideals.<\/p>\n

Thus, Trump, like Putin and Orban, was portrayed as a fascist dictator\u2014which he was, in the World According To Globalism.<\/p>\n

But there\u2019s something else to consider: the longing for a return to order, an end to chaos, and the repudiation of Woke ideology that underpinned the emotional investment so many \u201cMAGA\u201d supporters had in the unlikely figure of Donald Trump.<\/p>\n

Early on, his Internet supporters produced memes depicting Trump as \u201cGod Emperor<\/a>.\u201d That yearning for decisive leadership did not go unnoticed by the globalists and its Leftist militant arm.<\/p>\n

Hence the Regime Media\u2019s sharply negative reaction to Tucker Carlson\u2019s<\/a> interviewing Hungary\u2019s Viktor Orban, and to Carlson\u2019s sympathetic portrayal of what the national-conservative (\u201cright-illiberal<\/a>\u201c) Hungarian leadership is doing, including limiting immigration. This fed the beast of globo-Leftist fantasies about what the \u201cDeplorables\u201d are all about.<\/p>\n

Rod Dreher<\/a> has been in Hungary for a while and, in responding to David Frum\u2019s harsh criticism of Orban, explained why Hungarians, despite some misgivings about corruption under Orban, nevertheless support him<\/a>:<\/p>\n

I have spoken to plenty of Hungarians who assume \u2014 as many people in the post-communist countries of this region do \u2014 that their leaders are going to indulge in corruption\u2026One of them said that she doesn\u2019t like the government\u2019s corruption, but believes that Hungary can live with it. What it can\u2019t live with, she said, is the kind of corruption that says it\u2019s okay to teach children that they might be one of fifty genders. That form of corruption can destroy a society.<\/p>\n

Tucker In Budapest: Blowing People\u2019s Minds<\/a>, The American Conservative, <\/em>August 3, 2021<\/p>\n

And in Russia, a major reason Putin has remained in power so long has become apparent to this observer: lots of Russians have observed what is happening in the West\u2014and they have come to the conclusion that if the choice is between Pussy Riot<\/a> and Putin, they\u2019ll take Putin.<\/p>\n

Wayne Allensworth is a Corresponding Editor of <\/em>Chronicles magazine. He is the author of <\/em>The Russian Question: Nationalism, Modernization, and Post-Communist Russia ,<\/em><\/a> and a novel, <\/em>Field of Blood<\/a>. He writes at <\/em>American Remnant<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n

(Republished from VDare<\/a> by permission of author or representative)<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

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Wayne Allensworth on the parallels between the collapse of the Soviet Union and America today, and why the globalists hate Putin so much<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":39262,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_et_pb_use_builder":"","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[61,91],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-241949","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-Commentary","category-russia"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/241949","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/39262"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=241949"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/241949\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":241956,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/241949\/revisions\/241956"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=241949"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=241949"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.thetruthseeker.co.uk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=241949"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}