More technical \u201cbreakout\u201d estimates\u2014the time it would take Iran to compile enough highly-enriched uranium (HEU) to fuel one nuclear weapon\u2014continue to be published, with slightly varying timelines. Setting aside logic, wisdom, and a huge range of assumptions, if you average these five estimates, Iran would require 89.8 days, or three months, if it made a hypothetical rush for one bombs-worth of HEU.<\/span><\/p>\n \u2022 1.9-2.2 months<\/strong> (Institute for Science and International Security<\/span><\/a><\/strong><\/span>, October 24, 2013)<\/span><\/p>\n \u2022 6 months<\/strong> (Arms Control<\/span><\/a><\/strong><\/span>, September 29, 2014)<\/span><\/p>\n \u2022 1.7 months<\/strong> (Iran Watch<\/span><\/a><\/strong><\/span>, February 24, 2015)<\/span><\/p>\n \u2022 45-87 days<\/strong> (Bipartisan Policy Center<\/span><\/a><\/strong><\/span> February 23, 2015)<\/span><\/p>\n \u2022 3 months<\/strong> (Washington Institute<\/span><\/a><\/strong><\/span>, March 28, 2015)<\/span><\/p>\n It is essential to recognize that Iran does not currently have a nuclear-weapons program, nor does it possess a nuclear weapon. On February 26, James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, told<\/span><\/a> <\/strong><\/span>the Senate Armed Services Committee that Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran, ended his country\u2019s nuclear weapons program in 2003 and \u201cas far as we know, he\u2019s not made the decision to go for a nuclear weapon.\u201d This repeats the \u201chigh-confidence\u201d judgment<\/span><\/a><\/strong><\/span> of the U.S. intelligence community (IC) that was first made in November 2007. Clapper added that Iran \u201cwants to preserve options across the capabilities it would take to build [a nuclear weapon], but right now they don\u2019t have one, and have not made that decision.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n To repeat: Iran does not currently have a nuclear-weapons program, nor does it possess a nuclear weapon. So when a politician, analyst, or pundit mentions an Iranian \u201cnuclear-weapons program,\u201d they are referring to a program that the intelligence community is not aware of. If possible, tell that person to contact the Central Intelligence Agency through its \u201creport threats\u201d website<\/span><\/a><\/strong><\/span> to let the agency\u2019s nonproliferation analysts know about whatever secret information he or she is basing his or her judgment upon.<\/span><\/p>\n Iran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on July 1, 1968. Under the NPT, Iran agreed that it was a non-nuclear weapon state party, which prohibits Iran from receiving, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. Furthermore, like most other non-nuclear weapons states parties to the treaty, Iran entered into an NPT Safeguards Agreement<\/span><\/a><\/strong><\/span> with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which it did in May 1974. The crux of the 12-year dispute between Tehran and the IAEA is whether and to what extent Iran is in violation of its NPT obligations and UN Security Council resolution demands. As IAEA directors general have repeated, most recently Yuki Amano last week<\/span><\/a><\/strong><\/span>, the inspection agency has never received adequate clarifying information about the \u201cpossible military dimensions\u201d of Iran\u2019s nuclear program.<\/span><\/p>\n Sources: Hans M. Kristensen, “Civilian Research on the Status of Worldwide Nuclear Forces,” Briefing to the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Federation of American Scientists, March 5, 2015; Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Nuclear Notebook: US Nuclear Forces, 2015,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 71 (2), 2015, pp. 107-119; “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Means for the World (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2007), p. 269; Joel S. wit and Sun Young Ahn, “North Korea’s Nuclear Futures: Technology and Strategy,” U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, February 26, 2015.<\/p><\/div>\n While Iran has no bomb or nuclear-weapons program, nine other countries do, including five that also signed the NPT. Under the treaty, the five signatories pledge<\/span><\/a><\/strong><\/span> to \u201cpursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating \u2026 to nuclear disarmament.\u201d So while the world is focused on the nonproliferation requirements of a country with zero bombs, keep in mind the promises that remain unfulfilled from those countries with 9,835 of bombs, as well as the four countries that are nuclear outliers.<\/span><\/p>\nNuclear Weapons Capabilities by Country<\/strong><\/big><\/h2>\n
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