Our military guard true American causalities as top secret. Reports from Iraqi rebels are usually exaggerated. My best guess of American causalities in Falluja II comes from one line in the following news story. This story accuses Iraqi fighters of using narcotics in order to fight ferociously. But, the article also contains a line reads: “.. 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, one of lead units in the assault to oust the insurgents. The battalion, known as the Thundering Third, suffered 23 dead and 300 wounded.” If a battalion has 1,000 marines, then the causality rate is 32.3%. That is very high causality rate.
Fallujah insurgents were addicted to more than mayhem
Eric Herrera is an Army solider from Texas. He survived a grenade attack in Falluja during Thanksgiving weekend. (This is two weeks after our military declared Falluja victory.) He was flown back home. Eric’s description represents the first hand pictures at the Falluja front lines.
Here is what Eric said on December 26, 2004 from his Texas home:
“I heard the first one (grenade) go off and then I saw the second one come in … like actually hit the ground and explode.”
“That explosion on the streets Fallujah Thanksgiving weekend landed Eric home for the holidays – with a broken foot.”
Here are Eric’s comments on the battleground situation as he saw it:
“There’s a lot of people that don’t think we should be there … like my unit,” Herrera says. “We’re not doing good out there. We’re just soldiers dying left and right.”
Full story with video interview of Eric Herrera:
Some pictures of American losses in Iraq:
Bush: “Bring’em on” (in reference to Iraqis attacking US troops)
“blasted guerrilla strongholds”
“hammer rebel positions”
“tighten the noose”
“Unleash ‘Operation Phantom Fury'”
“smash what has become the largest remaining insurgent
stronghold in Iraq”
“hunt down last Fallujah rebels”
“have broken the back of the insurgency”
“mission accomplished in Fallujah, 1,600 rebels
A media blackout on Falluja news.
From New York Times, Jan 10, 2005:
“Hot Topic: How U.S. Might Disengage in Iraq”
“Conversation has started bubbling up in Congress, in the Pentagon, and some days even in the White House about when and how American forces might begin to disengage in Iraq.”
From a recent Iraqi resistance video:
Iraqi resistances to Bush: “You have asked us to bring it on, and so have we, like never expected! Do you have another challenge?”
“Sometimes, words have consequences you don’t intend them to mean.”
Full story (from January 14, 2005):
Shortly after the fall of Baghdad in April of 2003, France, Germany, and Russia asked to have UN lead the Iraqi reconstruction. The response from the Bush Administration was to scorn these countries for not supporting American invasion before but yet dreaming of sharing power in Iraq with America after our victory. The Neocon’s and Jewish radicals, who were – and still are – the powers that be in America, told France to face the military reality in Iraq. “Military reality” is the only language these arrogant neocon’s and Jewish radicals understand. The fact that their rhetoric has changed dramatically indicates that the military reality in Iraq must have changed dramatically.
All circumstantial evidence points to a failure to achieve either the American political or military goals of the Falluja II offensive. With 12,000 additional troops all in Iraq now, Falluja is still not under control. Continued attacks on supply lines pressure both civilian lives and the military operations. Car bombings, ambushes, and assassinations have intensified and even spread to the Shiite south. Election workers either have resigned or been killed execution-style. The January 30 election is in serious doubt. So far, the U. S. has been unable to take any meaningful measures to reverse or counter this worsening trend. Could it be that our troops are too busy defending themselves?
In November, it seems that American forces still had the upper hand militarily around Falluja, although at the time the goal of crushing the Iraqi rebels had already failed miserably. Now it looks like the rebels are actually gaining the upper hand militarily. It is not unreasonable to call the current situation an American defeat in Falluja II, although we don’t know the true extent of the defeat yet (such as the real American casualties.)
The Falluja II offensive in November represents the best that the American military can deliver in fighting Iraqi rebels, both in terms of manpower and firepower. The offensive turned out to be a dud. In recent weeks, there are rumors of a large scale American offensive in Mosul. It is doubtful that the military can launch a bigger offensive than Falluja II, in a city that is several times larger than Falluja. Unless the U. S. can send in a significant number of additional ground forces (such as 50,000 or more), the Iraqi rebels will be steadily winning the war militarily.
Yes, as our military had planned, Falluja II was a tipping point – except it is tipping in favor of the Iraqi rebels.
If I were a responsible military planner, I would have emergency helicopter evacuation plans ready, for all America personnel and top Iraqi puppets. Sorry, low level Iraqis who had cooperated with American troops will be abandoned, and have to fend for themselves.
The best-case scenario is for the election to be irrelevant. Why can Americans dictate the Iraqi political process now? Because, we toppled Saddam’s regime by force, we still have 150,000 troops in Iraq, and our forces have not yet been driven out of Iraq. The ugly truth is this: the military victor gains the political power, and writes the history. America will not be the final military victor in Iraq. Whatever America dictates now doesn’t really matter. The new victor will have the final say.
The revolutionary Chinese Communist leader, Chairman Mao, said it bluntly: “Political power grows out of the barrels of guns.”
The worse case: Sadr’ists and other Shiites join the fight against American forces after the election – probably out of the U. S. refusal to withdraw, defying the demand of a so-called “elected” and “legitimate” Iraqi government. This will quicken the American defeat.
An American military defeat is inevitable. What detours it will take to get there is the question.
I suspect that Sadr’s militia has been fighting American troops alongside Sunni rebels all along, despite the fact that they reached a truce with the Iraqi puppet government and the American military in Sep. 2004. Sadr’ists fought along with Sunni rebels during Falluja I in April 2004. The truce may be just a smoke screen. The truce saved Sadr City from Falluja-style destruction, and yet they can continue to attack American forces anonymously. Sadr’ists probably never turned in all their weapons, and could easily replace the weapons they did turn in at the beginning of the truce. The Iraqi rebels all wear masks. Nobody can tell if some of them are Sadr’ists. In fact, we don’t know exactly who the rebels are. Our military is fighting faceless enemies.
It is not clear the extent of Sadr’ist’s involvement. They can be just taking in Falluja refugees and providing some logistic supports. Most likely, Sadr’s militia has been actively attacking American forces, even if it is just to brush up on their militia training.
It is hard for me to imagine that the Sunni rebels alone can simultaneously neutralize the massive American assault on Falluja, overrun Mosul, and launch numerous and sustained attacks across Iraq, including some attacks in the Shiite south. In about two months since the Falluja II offensive, the Iraqi rebels have turned the table around and have American forces under some sort of siege, despite the additional 12,000 American troops. The Sunni rebels did it alone? I doubt it. Sure, the number of resistance fighters has been growing as reports confirmed; but the most plausible explanation is that Sadr’ists have been fighting all along without publicizing it.
The problem with Sadr’s militia (the Mahdi army) is its formal and publicized structure – a popular leader (Sadr), a base (Sadr City), black uniforms, identification cards, etc. Guerrilla fighters don’t wear uniforms and don’t expose their organizations or command structures. They don’t have fixed bases, either. As a result, guerrillas can melt away and re-emerge as they wish. Sadr’ists corrected this problem via the September truce and have been operating underground since.
Now we haven’t heard any of Sadr’s fury speeches for months. His black-uniformed militia has disappeared from the streets. But, we see the Iraqi rebels steadily gaining ground over American forces.
Would it not be foolhardy to believe that the insurgency is restricted to just Sunni rebels?
A widespread general conception (or more accurately – misconception) is that the American military might is irresistible, especially fighting against third-world armed forces like the Iraqis. If the U. S. ever loses in Iraq, it must be because of non-military factors: such as political unpopularity, unbearable financial costs of the war, etc.
Most remember the vivid images of humiliating Iraqi defeats in the Gulf War I and during the initial stages of the current Iraq War. Our movies and TVs are still saturated with the invincible pictures of our mighty military hardware, jet fighters, helicopters, armors, etc., charging around and blowing up enemies with missiles and smart bombs. Who would have thought that the military situation in Iraq could have soured so unbelievably fast?
Before the Iraqi Invasion, nobody – for or against the war – believed that a straight-out American military defeat is possible. Now this impossibility is turning into reality in front of our very eyes. It is ironic that the mighty American military is not to be defeated by some formidable foes (such as the former Soviet Red Army), but by the most unlikely force – the rag-tag Iraqi guerrillas.
Is it fate that whoever superstitiously worships brute forces, eventually fails miserably on the very brute forces they worship?
Is this God’s ultimate ridicule on humanity’s futile empire-building efforts that the latest empire (America) meets its fate at the ruins of the first one (Babylon) – four thousands years apart?
(Note: Ancient Babylon lies in ruin only 60 miles from Baghdad.)
Part One: American Military Defeat in Falluja II
story goes with the previous video)