Big blunders behind botched US-led strike in Syria in September -inquiry

Introduction — Nov 29, 2016

Air strike against Isis. Click to enlarge

Air strike against Isis. Click to enlarge

At the time Russia’s UN ambassador Vitaly Churkin said the U.S. led strike on the Syrian army looked “highly suspicious” and we can only concur.
Shortly after the U.S.-led air strike left 62 Syrian soldiers dead, ISIL fighters followed up with a ground assault. The fact that the ISIL assault took place a matter of minutes after the air strike suggests some coordination between the two.
So despite admitting a “mistake” the U.S. military inquiry into the incident amounts to what is sometimes referred to as a “limited hangout”. In that the admission that a “mistake” was made is used to conceal a much darker crime — U.S. coordination with ISIL (ISIS, Islamic State or Daesh).
 Just as significant as the covert collusion between the West and Islamic militants is the way the corporate Western media is studiously ignoring any suggestion of complicity between the two. There’s no hint of that in the following Reuters report. Ed.

Big blunders behind botched US-led strike in Syria in September -inquiry

Idrees Ali and Phil Stewart — Reuters Nov 29, 2016

A U.S. military investigation has concluded that a series of “unintentional human errors” led to a coalition air strike on Sept. 17 that killed fighters aligned with the Syrian regime instead of the Islamic State militants they were targeting.

The incident, which Moscow said killed more than 60 Syrian soldiers, sparked a controversy and prompted an emergency U.N. Security Council meeting as tensions between Russia and the United States spiked.

Brigadier General Richard Coe, who led the investigation, told reporters at the Pentagon via a conference call on Tuesday that the major errors ranged from a basic misidentification of targets to “group think” during intelligence development and even a communications blunder on a hotline with Russia.

But Coe also defended the coalition personnel involved, saying they were “good people trying to do the right thing.”

“These people get it right far more often than not, but this time they came up short,” Coe said.

The investigation threw light on the difficult – and dangerous – work of developing targets for coalition air strikes against Islamic State in parts of Iraq and Syria where the United States does not have forces on the ground or reliable informants within the population to ensure its intelligence is sound.

The U.S.-led coalition mistook Syrian-aligned forces for Islamic State fighters in part because they were not wearing traditional uniforms, Coe said. An early mistake – misidentifying a vehicle as belonging to Islamic State – colored intelligence that came later when it drove into a larger fighting position near Deir al-Zor airport.

But Coe acknowledged that major red flags were missed. One analyst saw a tank moving around and even typed into a network chat room that “what we are looking at can’t possibly be ISIL,” Coe said, using an acronym for Islamic State.

The mistakes continued even after the strike began.

Moscow had reached out repeatedly through a hotline to the U.S.-led coalition, trying to inform them that they were striking Syrian regime targets instead of Islamic State.

But the designated U.S. military point-of-contact was unavailable for 27 minutes. In those 27 minutes, 15 of the strikes took place against what the U.S.-led coalition believed were Islamic State fighters.

“This was obviously a missed opportunity to be able to limit the damage of the mistake,” Coe said, adding that the strikes would have continued had the Russians not called and eventually passed along their information.

The strikes included aircraft from the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and Denmark which dropped 34 precision-guided weapons and fired 380 rounds of 30-millimeter ammunition.

Even before the strike took place, the coalition made a big mistake – it initially contacted the Russians to inform them that aircraft would be near Deir al-Zor, but gave the wrong coordinates for the strike.

“Of course we don’t know for sure, but it is possible had we passed the right location to the Russians, they would have had the opportunity to warn us before the first strike even started,” Coe said.

(Reporting by Idrees Ali and Phil Stewart; Editing by Jonathan Oatis)


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